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Come Shale Away: Navigating the 
“Business Friendliness” of Regulatory 
Environments in the Marcellus Shale 
and Albertan Oil Sands 
By Jivaji Moré* 
Abstract: In today’s often-tumultuous economic climate, the appeal of 
investment in North America’s unconventional fossil fuel “revolution” has 
remained both consistent and strong.  In the United States, countless energy 
companies have focused on extracting natural gas from deposits of shale rock.  
In Canada, firms have sought to turn deposits of bituminous “oil sands” into a 
secure, domestic source of synthetic crude oil.  But where, if given a choice 
between the two countries, might a firm otherwise indifferent to extracting 
natural gas or oil choose to drill?  This Comment attempts to answer this 
question by analyzing federal, state/provincial, and local/municipal regulatory 
regimes in Pennsylvania, United States (home of the vast Marcellus Shale play) 
and Alberta, Canada (home to most of Canada’s oil sands).  Ultimately, this 
Comment isolates three main differences between the regulatory regimes 
governing these two regions, and concludes that, at least in the near term, 
regulations in Alberta and the oil sands are more “business friendly” to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 16, 2011, Kinder Morgan, Inc. agreed to purchase rival oil 
and gas pipeline operator El Paso Corp. for $38 billion in cash, stock, and 





  The transaction gave Kinder Morgan access to a variety of 
pipeline assets, leaving it with a dominant position in North American 
natural gas distribution, as well as control over the flow of crude oil from 
Canada to the west coast of the United States.
2
  It was the largest announced 
merger of 2011—a deal indicative of the appeal and promise of North 




Oil and natural gas extracted from shale rock, and crude oil derived 
from Canada’s “oil sands” are perhaps the unconventional fossil fuels of 
greatest interest to Kinder Morgan and its peers.
4
  Unlike more traditional 
forms of oil and natural gas, these unconventional resources are not trapped 
inside vast underground reservoirs of rock.
5
  Instead, they exist within 
individual rocks themselves, and must be extracted through processes that 
can be more difficult and costly than those used to extract conventional oil 
and gas.
6





viability in recent years, the development of North American shale and oil 
sands reserves has exploded.  In the eyes of many, North America is 
 
 1  Michael J. De La Merced & Clifford Krauss, Kinder Morgan to Buy El Paso for $21.1 
Billion, DEALBOOK (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:53 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/kinder-morgan-to-buy-el-paso/.  The deal became 
effective on May 24, 2012.  Kinder Morgan and El Paso Announce Planned Closing Date of 
May 24, 2012, BUS. WIRE (May 10, 2012, 11:20 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120510006271/en/Kinder-Morgan-El-Paso-
Announce-Planned-Closing. 
 2  De La Merced & Krauss, supra note 1. 
 3  Press Release, Mergermarket, Mergermarket M&A Round-up for Year End 2011, at 3 
(Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/Press-Release-for-Financial-Advisers-
Year-End-2011.pdf. 
 4  See De La Merced & Krauss, supra note 1. 
 5  GENE WHITNEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40872, U.S. FOSSIL FUEL RESOURCES, 
TERMINOLOGY, REPORTING, AND SUMMARY 6 (2010), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.view&FileStore_id=04212e22-
c1b3-41f2-b0ba-0da5eaead952.  Geologically speaking, conventional oil and gas resources 
migrate from within the “source rock” from which they have originated to underground 
reservoirs, while unconventional resources remain within the source rock.  Press Release, 
U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Releases First Assessment of Shale Resources in the Utica 
Shale: 38 Trillion Cubic Feet (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=3419&from=rss_home. 
 6  WHITNEY ET AL., supra note 5. 
 7  See DAN WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., PEMBINA INST., OIL SANDS FEVER: THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANADA’S OIL SANDS RUSH 2–3 (2005), available at 
pubs.pembina.org/reports/oilsands72.pdf (discussing the government of Alberta’s campaign 
to attract drillers to the oil sands).  The economic viability of oil sands excavation will be 
discussed at greater length later in this Comment. 
 8  WHITNEY ET AL., supra note 5.  For a detailed discussion of the technological advances 
of shale gas extraction, see infra Part II.A. 
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currently in the midst of an energy “revolution.”9 
The impacts of this revolution have so far been resounding. North 
America now holds vast quantities of two of the world’s important fossil 
fuels.
10
  Extraction is still on the rise, and as acquisition activity suggests, 




Further, notwithstanding periodic short-term price changes, both shale 
gas and oil sands crude are resources for which there is likely to be strong 
demand.
12
  Moreover, both resources are located within North America’s 
borders and are thus more secure than many of the United States and 
Canada’s traditional sources for fossil fuels, such as the Middle East and 
Africa.  As Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently suggested, 
there is considerable economic value in having a stake in the democratic 
world’s largest supply of “ethical oil.”13 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the continued exploitation of 
North American shale plays and oil sands deposits fuels a strong engine for 
economic growth.  Simply put, the development of these resources creates 
 
 9  While the term “revolution” has been commonly associated with the recent explosion 
in shale gas supply, see, e.g., David Brooks, Editorial, The Shale Gas Revolution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A31, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/brooks-the-shale-gas-revolution.html, this 
Comment contends that the term is equally applicable to the oil sands of Western Canada. 
 10  North America holds over 80% of the world’s oil sands reserves, with 53.7 billion 
barrels of oil in the United States and over 1.6 trillion in Canada.  MARC HUMPHRIES ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34258, NORTH AMERICAN OIL SANDS: HISTORY OF 
DEVELOPMENT, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 2–4 (2008), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34258.pdf.  Meanwhile, the United States and Canada have a 
combined 55 trillion cubic meters of unconventional natural gas reserves (37 trillion for the 
United States and 18 trillion for Canada), more than any individual country in the world.  See 
An Unconventional Bonanza, ECONOMIST (July 14, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558432 (displaying this information graphically).  As 
Canada has more oil sands than the United States, and the United States has more 
unconventional gas than Canada, this Comment generally associates the oil sands with 
Canada and shale deposits with the United States. 
 11  See, e.g., Mark Scott, Energy Deals See an Upswing as Bargains Abound, DEALBOOK 
(Oct. 17, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/behind-the-surge-in-
energy-deals-2/. 
 12  According to the International Energy Agency (an independent organization focused 
on monitoring world energy trends), world oil consumption is expected to rise by more than 
13% between 2010 and 2035.  Press Release, Int’l Energy Agency, The World is Locking 
Itself into an Unsustainable Energy Future Which Would have Far Reaching Consequences 
(Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2011/november/name,20318,en.html.  
Global demand for natural gas is also expected to rise during this period.  Id. 
 13  See Louise Egan, Canada PM Applauds Job Creation, Defends Oil Sands, REUTERS 
(Jan. 7, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/07/us-economy-harper-
idUSTRE7064CT20110107. 
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jobs, often in communities where job creation is sorely needed.
14
  In total, 
the shale industry has already created half a million jobs in the United 
States.
15
  Reports suggest that an additional 870,000 shale-industry jobs 
may be added by 2015.
16
  Meanwhile, development of the oil sands has 
helped Canada recoup the majority of the jobs it lost during the 2009 
recession.
17
  The job creating potential of shale gas and oil sands activity is 
not insignificant, especially as North America’s economies have entered a 




This Comment begins with the premise that North America’s 
unconventional fossil fuel revolution should be encouraged.  It seeks to 
identify regulatory hurdles in the United States and Canada that potentially 
limit fossil-fuel development, and it asks if these hurdles might impact the 
behavior of a hypothetical energy company otherwise indifferent to 




 14  See, e.g., John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers Return to 
Pennsylvania with a Vengeance—Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2011) (discussing how the explosion of interest in the Marcellus Shale formation has made 
several landowners “millionaires overnight”); Steve Hargreaves, Billions of Barrels of 
Untapped U.S. Oil, CNN MONEY (Mar. 9, 2011, 4:13 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/04/news/economy/oil_shale_bakken/index.htm (discussing 
ability of resource exploitation to prop up local economies in North Dakota’s Bakken Shale 
play); Brooks, supra note 9 (mentioning shale drilling’s impact on an “economically 
wounded” western Pennsylvania). 
 15  See Brooks, supra note 9. 
 16  Jim Efstathiou, Jr., Shale-Gas Drilling to Add 870,000 Jobs by 2015, Report Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-06/shale-
gas-drilling-to-add-870-000-u-s-jobs-by-2015-report-says.html (discussing an industry-
group-commissioned report additionally claiming $118 billion in economic growth from 
shale gas in the next four years). 
 17  See Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Opinion, Canada’s Oil Sands are a Jobs Gusher, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904836104576560933917369412.html. 
 18  Although now a relatively ubiquitous term for the prognosis of systemic slow growth 
in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 credit crisis, the idea of the “new normal” was actually 
developed by fund managers Bill Gross and Mohammed El-Erian.  See Peter C. Beller & 
Michael Maiello, Pimco’s New Normal, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/investing-mutual-funds-stocks-pimco-new-
normal.html. 
 19  In order to effect this comparison, this Comment assumes that crude oil and natural 
gas production hold equal appeal to those in the energy sector.  This may not necessarily be 
true in the immediate status quo, as a current glut of American natural gas is driving prices 
lower and lower, at least in the short term.  See Shale Gas: Boom or Glut?, ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Jan. 20, 2012, 4:50 PM), 
http://eiuviews.com/index.php/energy/2012/01/20/shale-gas-boom-or-glut/.  However, this 
glut is not stopping investment in shale gas by energy companies, who are taking a more 
bullish long-term view with an eye to eventually exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to 
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In developing its analysis, this Comment focuses on the regulatory 
environments of Alberta, Canada (home to most of North America’s oil 
sands)
20
 and Pennsylvania, United States (home to the vast Marcellus Shale 
play).
21
  The first Part of this Comment will provide background 
information on these regions, their specific resources, and the impacts of oil 
and gas extraction.  Part II will discuss current federal and state/provincial 
regulatory regimes in Pennsylvania and Alberta.  Part III will address 
differences between these regulatory regimes and discuss their implications 
for developers.  Finally, this Comment will conclude that Alberta’s 
regulatory regime is more favorable to developers than Pennsylvania’s 
regime, and argue that exploitation of the oil sands, at least in the short 




countries where gas is in higher demand.  Id.  Companies have already begun to receive 
permission from the U.S. Department of Energy to export LNG, and the United States will 
likely be a net-exporter of LNG by 2016.  See Katarzyna Klimasinska, U.S. Seen Being a 
Liquefied Gas Exporter in 2016 on Fracking Gains, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2012, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-23/u-s-seen-being-liquefied-gas-exporter-in-
2016-on-fracking-gains.html. 
 20  HUMPHRIES ET AL., supra note 10, at 4. 
 21  See Susan L. Sakmar, The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States Be the 
Role Model for the Development of Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 369, 
384 (2011). 
 22  While Alberta is the locus of oil sands extraction in both Canada and North America, 
HUMPHRIES ET AL., supra note 10, at 4, Pennsylvania is not the only location for shale 
drilling in the United States.  See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 58 (2012) [hereinafter USEIA 2012 ENERGY 
OUTLOOK], available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf (listing the 
reserves of selected domestic shale plays).  Nevertheless, according to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration’s (EIA) 2012 Annual Energy Outlook report, the Marcellus 
Shale contains more than 140 trillion cubic feet of unproved natural gas reserves—the most 
of any domestic play listed in the report.  Id.  More than 60% of these gas reserves are 
located in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 64.  Unproved oil and gas resources are reserves that are 
estimated to be technically recoverable given current technology but without consideration 
for economics or existing operating conditions.  Id. at 56.  These reserves become “proved” 
when they are expected to be produced, given economics and existing operating conditions.  
Id.  While the Marcellus Shale may not have the highest proved reserves of gas in the United 
States (this honor belongs to the Barnett Shale formation), the EIA recently reported that its 
proved reserves at the start of 2010 were 129 times greater than at their level in 2008—the 
greatest increase of any principal shale play analyzed by the EIA.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS PROVED RESERVES, 
2010, at 11 (2012) [hereinafter USEIA CRUDE REPORT], available at 
http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/pdf/uscrudeoil.pdf.  This increase, along 
with the potential for gains in future natural gas extraction in the Marcellus Shale, inform 
this Comment’s decision to use Pennsylvania and its regulatory environment for its cross-
border comparative analysis. 




A.  Pennsylvania 
Named after a shale-rock outcropping in Marcellus, New York, the 
Marcellus Shale is an underground formation of shale located about 6,000 
feet below parts of Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, and Ohio.
23
  
Geographically, the formation covers approximately 95,000 square miles—
territory that includes forty-nine of Pennsylvania’s sixty-seven counties.24  
Because it covers approximately two-thirds of Pennsylvania, the Marcellus 
Shale has typically been associated with the state.
25
 
In a recent report, the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
estimated that the Marcellus Shale contains over 140 trillion cubic feet of 
technically recoverable, unproved natural gas.
26
  Independent estimates 
suggest that there may be even more recoverable gas than this—perhaps as 
much as 330 trillion cubic feet.
27
  Though oil can also be extracted from 
shale rock, the Marcellus Shale is not known for oil production.
28
 
Extraction of the Marcellus Shale’s natural gas has only been 
economically viable since 2004.
29
  Development only began after advances 
in extraction technology enabled drillers to feasibly break open shale rock 
and release its natural gas.
30
  Two technological leaps were particularly 
useful in this regard. 
First, improvements in horizontal drilling technology made natural gas 
extraction economically viable.  Horizontal drilling is critical to shale gas 
extraction for a variety of reasons: 
[H]orizontal drilling increases penetration into the reservoirs because 
the natural gas exists in horizontal planes.  In addition, horizontal 
drilling enables the drill to access more fractures.  Finally, and most 
 
 23  Smith, supra note 14, at 4. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Laura C. Reeder, Note, Creating a Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas 
Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
999, 1000 (2010). 
 26  USEIA 2012 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 22, at 58.  For a definition of “unproved” 
resources, see supra note 12. 
 27  Kevin Begos, Associated Press, Reports: Marcellus Reserves Larger Than Expected, 
BIG STORY (Oct. 20, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/reports-marcellus-
reserves-larger-expected. 
 28  See, e.g., USEIA 2012 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 22, at 58 (not listing the 
Marcellus Shale as an oil-producing shale play); USEIA CRUDE REPORT, supra note 22, at 11 
(noting that the bulk of total oil discoveries in 2010 came from shale plays in Texas and 
North Dakota, as well as from offshore sites in the Gulf of Mexico). 
 29  Smith, supra note 14, at 4. 
 30  Id. 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:393 (2013) 
400 
importantly from a land use perspective, horizontal drilling enables 
extraction of natural gas from beneath areas, such as cities, where 
drilling rigs typically cannot be assembled.
31
 
Second, innovations in the area of hydraulic fracturing, or, as it is more 
commonly called, “fracking,” helped make the release of natural gas from 
shale rock possible.
32
  Fracking generally involves injecting liquid through 
a drill at high pressure into shale rock.
33
  This pressure creates fissures in 
the shale, releasing natural gas that can then be pumped to the surface.
34
  
The specific method of fracking used in the Marcellus Shale—“slick water 
fracking”—was imported from Texas, where it was utilized successfully in 
the smaller Barnett Shale play.
35
  In slick water fracking, large amounts of 
fresh water, sand, and “either gel or another friction-reducing substance” 
are pumped underground.36  These substances combat the low permeability 
of the shale by maximizing the length and height of any fractures made.
37
  
With respect to the non-aqueous components of typical fracking fluid, 




Aboveground, there is an extensive infrastructure devoted to fracking.  
Fracking operations often contain as many as ten points of underground 
extraction.
39
  These points of extraction, called “well pads,” typically 
contain each the following: wells; diesel-powered drill rigs; large, diesel-
powered pumps used for injecting fracking fluid underground; trailers for 
housing the drilling crew; and “frac” ponds used to hold the fresh water 
soon to be injected underground and/or already-used fracking fluid.
40
  The 
frac ponds are particularly enormous—usually several acres in size.41 
Well pads also connect to structures related to the “midstream” transfer 
and processing of natural gas.
42
  Here, raw material is extracted from the 
well pads, stripped of its liquid components, and transformed into the 
natural gas that is later sold to “downstream” distributors.43  Midstream 
structures connect to pipeline networks that can allow for the inter-state and 
 
 31  Reeder, supra note 25, at 1004. 
 32  Smith, supra note 14, at 4. 
 33  Sakmar, supra note 21, at 377. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Reeder, supra note 25, at 1004–05. 
 36  Id. at 1005. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Sakmar, supra note 21, at 378. 
 39  Smith, supra note 14, at 7. 
 40  Id. at 6. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 7–8. 
 43  Id. 
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even cross-continental transfer of gas produced on a well pad.
44
 
Shale drilling and the natural gas industry have brought a great deal of 
economic activity to Pennsylvania.  The lure of investment in natural gas 
extraction, transfer, and processing has brought both strategic and financial 
buyers to the region.
45
  Foreign companies seeking access to the industry 
have also descended on the Marcellus Shale.
46
  Further, at a more granular 
level, shale gas has created thousands of jobs in Pennsylvania.
47
  Counties 
in which drilling directly occurs saw nonfarm employment grow over 5% 
between 2009 and 2011—a level far exceeding the growth rate for the rest 
of Pennsylvania.
48
  Nearby cities servicing the shale gas industry have seen 
strong gains in employment ancillary to the energy sector.
49
  Depending on 
the price of natural gas in future years, Wells Fargo estimates that 




Economic benefits notwithstanding, however, shale drilling is not 
without its hazards and its critics.  Fracking operations “generate light, 
noise, dust, fumes, traffic, and drastic changes to the land, all of which 
affect the daily lives of the people living in [local Pennsylvania] 
 
 44  De La Merced & Krauss, supra note 1. 
 45  See, e.g., Peter Lattman, K.K.R.’s Energy Billionaires Club, DEALBOOK (Nov. 25, 
2011, 12:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/k-k-r-s-energy-billionaires-club/ 
(discussing a specific investment by private equity firm Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts); 
Sakmar, supra note 21, at 404 (discussing Exxon’s 2009 merger with XTO Energy for 
purposes of gaining access to well sites and drilling expertise). 
 46  See, e.g., Erich Schwartzel, Marcellus Shale Development Puts State on Map 
Internationally, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://old.post-
gazette.com/pg/12080/1218001-334.stm (discussing current or potential future investments 
by Norway’s Statoil, Germany’s Bayer Corp., and British Petroleum); Sakmar, supra note 
21, at 392 (mentioning a 2010 $1.7 billion investment in the Marcellus Shale by India’s 
largest private company, Reliance Industries). 
 47  Recent studies by various institutions estimate that the shale gas industry created 
between 10,000 and 44,000 new jobs in Pennsylvania in 2009.  See John L. Micek, Drilling 
for Jobs, MORNING CALL (Apr. 14, 2012), http://articles.mcall.com/2012-04-14/news/mc-pa-
marcellus-jobs-boom-20120414_1_natural-gas-marcellus-shale-gas-pipeline. 
 48  JAY BRYSON, TIM QUINLAN & JOE SEYDL, WELLS FARGO LLC ECON. GRP., RECENT 
PENNSYLVANIA JOB TRENDS: EFFECTS OF SHALE? 4 (2012), 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/com/insights/economics/regional-
reports/PennsylvaniaShale_03122012.pdf. 
 49  In the city of Williamsport, for instance, the energy sector has not only been 
responsible for 40% of employment growth since February 2010, but has also likely affected 
growth in the City’s leisure and hospitality sector, which has been responsible for 35% of 
employment growth during the same period.  Id.  Pittsburgh has also experienced a similar, 
albeit less pronounced, effect.  Id. at 5. 
 50  Id. at 9.  While this forecast does not isolate jobs created specifically within the energy 
sector, Wells Fargo conducted its study for the purpose of determining the extent to which 
the shale gas industry was driving employment growth in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 6. 
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communities.”51  Further, fracking has been associated with significant 
environmental and public health concerns.  Although a 2011 poll indicated 
that approximately two-thirds of Pennsylvanians viewed the economic 
benefits of the shale gas industry as outweighing environmental concerns,
52
 
these concerns have still fueled significant public outcry.
53
 
At the center of this controversy are the chemicals used in the 
hydraulic fracturing process.  In an extensive report on the environmental 
impact of the shale gas industry, public interest news group ProPublica 
identified leaking condensate tanks (tanks used to hold liquid hydrocarbons 
detached from extracted natural gas) and massive, open-air frac ponds as 
possible sources of air and groundwater contamination.
54
  ProPublica also 
reported that people living close to fracking operations have experienced 
respiratory infections, headaches, nausea, rashes, and “[m]ore rarely,” 
miscarriages, tumors, cancer, and benzene poisoning.
55
  Nevertheless, 
ProPublica noted that researchers have not been able to “‘draw good solid 
conclusions about whether [fracking] is a public health risk as a whole.’”56  
Similarly, evidence linking fracking chemicals to livestock deaths across 
Pennsylvania is so far anecdotal.
57
 
Whether real or imagined, the threat of contamination has captured the 
public’s attention.  Celebrities have publicly come out against fracking in 
Pennsylvania and other states.
58
  The Emmy-award-winning documentary 
 
 51  Smith, supra note 14, at 9. 
 52  Kris Maher, New Challenges to Gas Drilling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2011, at A3. 
 53   See, e.g., James Gerken, Delaware Basin Fracking Decision Delayed, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 23, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/23/delaware-river-
basin-fracking-decision_n_1108141.html; Sarah Hoye, “Fracking” Protesters Say Jobs Not 
Worth Environmental Risks, CNN.COM (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:58 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/09/20/philadelphia.fracking.protests/index.html?hpt=hp_bn1. 
 54  Abrahm Lustgarden & Nicholas Kusnetz, Science Lags as Health Problems Near Gas 
Fields, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:35 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/science-
lags-as-health-problems-emerge-near-gas-fields.  Open-air frac ponds are a particular issue 
for Pennsylvania, unlike other states (such as Texas), since Pennsylvania does not have 
limestone-capped subterranean reservoirs that can be used to hold spent fracking fluid.  
Reeder, supra note 25, at 1012. 
 55  Lunstgarden & Kusnetz, supra note 54. 
 56  Id. (quoting Christopher Portier, Director of the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry and the National Center for Environmental Health).  Part of the reason 
why there are only anecdotal findings at this stage is because natural gas drilling has only 
occurred in Pennsylvania in earnest since 2008.  Id. 
 57  Mike DiPaola, Fracking’s Toll on Pets, Livestock Chills Farmers, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
7, 2012, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-08/fracking-s-toll-on-pets-
livestock-chills-pennsylvania-farmers-commentary.html (“We don’t know what the 
chemicals are in a lot of these cases,” says Bamberger. “It gets very frustrating when you 
start saying: What was in the tissue? What killed these animals exactly?”). 
 58  See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Chants, Boos, and Celebrities at a Hearing on Fracking, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/chants-boos-and-
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“GasLand” showed residential tap water located close to shale gas 
operations catching fire when exposed to an open flame.
59
  The state of 
New York has even gone so far as to declare a ban on fracking within its 
borders.
60
  Indeed, supporters of the New York state moratorium point to 
fracking’s impact on Pennsylvania as evidence for why the ban should stay 
in place.
61
  Ultimately, the public health concern associated with fracking 
circumscribes the economic promise of shale drilling in Pennsylvania, and 
undoubtedly informs the scope of federal and state regulations. 
B.  Alberta 
In contrast to the United States, where shale plays are located in 
multiple states, Canada has oil sands reserves that are almost entirely 
located within the province of Alberta.
62
  Nevertheless, these reserves are 
enormous, underlying an area of boreal forests approximately the size of the 
state of Florida, or 149,000 square kilometers.
63
  These reserves exist in 
three main deposits: Peace River, Cold Lake, and Athabasca, which is the 
largest and most developed of the deposits.
64
  Per a 2010 estimate, the 
Alberta government claims that the oil sands hold approximately 170 
billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves.
65
  This gives Canada the third 
largest oil reserves in the world, behind only Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
66
 
Despite its connection to crude oil, the term “oil sand” is something of 
 
celebrities-at-a-standoff-on-fracking/ (mentioning appearances by three actors at a recent 
hearing in New York); Kate Sinding, Celebrities Speak Out to Keep New York’s Tap Water 
Safe from Fracking, SWITCHBOARD: NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (June 8, 
2011), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ksinding/new_video_celebrities_speak_ou.html 
(mentioning a new online video about fracking and water quality launched by the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, which features several famous actors); Gerken, supra note 53 
(mentioning appearances by Josh Fox, the director of “GasLand,” and actor Mark Ruffalo at 
a recent anti-shale rally). 
 59  Hoye, supra note 53. 
 60  Inae Oh, New York Fracking Protest Urges Cuomo to Ban Controversial Drilling, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/22/new-york-fracking-protest-cuomo-
photos_n_1822575.html. 
 61  See id.; Mary Esch, Associated Press, For NY Farmers, Fracking Means Salvation _ 
or Ruin, BIG STORY (May 20, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/content/ny-farmers-
fracking-means-salvation-or-ruin. 
 62  WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Facts and Statistics, ALTA. ENERGY, http://www.energy.alberta.ca/oilsands/791.asp 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 65  WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 11. 
 66  Country Comparison: Oil—Proved Reserves, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
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a misnomer; oil sands are neither really oil, in the conventional sense, nor 
sand.  Rather, oil sands deposits are combinations of sand, water, clay, silt, 
and crude bitumen.
67
  Crude bitumen is the material relevant to the 




The history of oil sands development in Alberta began in 1944, when 
the government of Alberta entered into a joint venture with a private 
company to build a pilot plant near the city of Fort McMurray.
69
  
Commercial production began in the late-1960s, and remained relatively 
low through the mid-1990s, although the cost of bitumen extraction fell 
during this period as well.
70
 
Starting in the mid-1990s, however, the Alberta government 
consciously tried to make the oil sands an economically viable resource, 
convening a task force of oil industry representatives and government 
officials to study the issue.
71
  The government eventually implemented 
many of the task force’s recommendations.72  One of the implemented 
recommendations was a public relations campaign aimed at raising the 
profile of the oil sands both in Canada and abroad.
73
  Here, Alberta 
attempted to improve the public perception of its oil reserves by declaring 
the sands a “national prize,” and by adopting the name “oil sands” instead 
of the previously used, dirtier sounding “tar sands.”74 
Also implemented were the task force’s economic recommendations, 
aimed at incentivizing development.  In 1997, Alberta’s provincial 
government established a generous royalty regime for oil sands developers; 
the government’s Generic Oil Sands Regime promised to collect only 1% of 
a developer’s total revenue until the developer had recovered all of its 
capital expenses, after which Alberta would collect 25% of the total 
revenue.
75
  In addition to encouraging initial investments in oil sands 
extraction, this structure also promoted rapid reinvestment and growth.
76
 
Economic incentives also manifested themselves at the federal level 
through tax policy.  Through tax deductions, for instance, the federal 
government allowed accelerated cost recovery of expenses relating to oil 
 
 67  See WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 11. 
 68  See id. at 13–14. 
 69  Id. at 2. 
 70  Id. at 2–3. 
 71  Id. at 3. 
 72  See id. 
 73  See WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
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sands extraction, including the cost of oil sands leases and strip mining.
77
  
Similar to the effect of Alberta’s royalty regime, Canada’s accelerated cost 
recovery provision was aimed at incentivizing developers to continue 
spending on oil sands projects.
78
 
By the mid-2000s, many foreign oil companies had begun moving into 
the oil sands.
79
  Exposure to the resource increased in the American energy 
community, spurring heavy demand.
80
  As of 2011, output from the oil 
sands was pegged at 1.6 million barrels of crude oil per day, with 
production figures expected to more than double by 2025.
81
 
The depth of any particular deposit determines the method by which 
oil sands are extracted and crude bitumen is removed.
82
  Strip mining is 
typically used to access shallower deposits, usually less than 100 meters 
from the surface.
83
  Here, the overburden—trees, soil, and rock irrelevant to 
mining—is cleared, leaving underlying bituminous ore exposed for 
removal.
84
  The extracted oil sands are subsequently mixed with hot water 
and chemically treated to separate the bitumen from the rest of the mixture, 
referred to as “tailings.”85 
More common than strip mining is in-situ recovery, which is more 
appropriate for extracting bitumen at greater depths.
86
  Generally, with in-
situ extraction, steam is pumped underground to the oil sands, where it 
separates bitumen from the rest of the oil sands by reducing the bitumen’s 
 
 77  See Nathan Vanderklippe & Carrie Tait, Oil Sands Tax Incentives Targeted, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Mar. 22, 2011, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/business/oil-sands-tax-incentives-
targeted/article1952194/page1/. 
 78  See id. 
 79  See, e.g., Sonja Franklin & Eduard Gismatullin, BP, Husky Energy Agree to Form Oil-
Sands Partnerships (Update6), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2007, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a18oTMnaz4zQ&refer=cana
da; In-Soo Nam, KNOC, Other South Korean Cos to Jointly Develop Canada Oil Sands, 
DOW JONES NEWSWIRE (Mar. 16, 2007), 
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=42657 (discussing a 2006 investment by 
KNOC); Synenco & Sinopec Enter Deal for Canadian Oil Sands Project, RIGZONE (May 31, 
2005), http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=22835. 
 80  WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. 
 81  Press Release, Can. Ass’n of Petroleum Producers, Conventional Production, Oil 
Sands Projects Underpin Strong Crude Oil Forecast (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.capp.ca/aboutUs/mediaCentre/NewsReleases/Pages/2012-oil-forecast.aspx. 
 82  See Jason Metcalf, Waste in the Land of Plenty: An Examination of the Theoretical 
Implications of Waste on the Alberta Oil Sands Deposit, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 227, 228 (2007). 
 83  WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 11. 
 84  Metcalf, supra note 82. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
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  The bitumen is then pumped upwards.
88
  In the most common 
form of in-situ extraction,
89
 between four and ten pairs of wells extract 
bitumen at the same time.
90
 
As with shale drilling, oil sands infrastructure does not end with 
extraction.  Crude bitumen still must be upgraded to commercially viable, 
synthetic crude oil.
91
  Upgrading proceeds in two steps: first, either coking 
or hydrocracking for fracturing large bitumen hydrocarbons into smaller 




Regardless of the specific method employed, the upgrading of oil 
sands bitumen into synthetic crude oil is inefficient and resource intensive.  
All told, two tons of oil sands must be extracted and processed to produce 
one barrel of synthetic crude oil.
93
  Further, the bitumen extraction and 
upgrading process requires energy itself—usually in the form of natural 
gas.
94
  Though natural gas is relatively clean burning, it was estimated in 




The energy intensiveness of the oil sands industry is a point of 
environmental concern.  Though the industry has made significant strides in 
becoming more energy efficient in recent years, “the rapid rate of new 
development has more than consumed these gains.”96  Currently “[o]il-
sands crude results in emissions from production and consumption in 
vehicles that are about [twenty] percent higher than the average emissions 
of conventional oil production in the U.S.”97  These emissions contribute to 
 
 87  Id. at 229. 
 88  There are two common methods of in-situ mining: Cyclic Steam Stimulation (CSS) 
and Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD).  Id.  For CSS, a single well may be used to 
both heat the oil sands and pump up the separated bitumen.  Id.  For SAGD, two horizontally 
drilled wells are used, with steam constantly injected in one, and bitumen constantly 
recovered in the other.  Id. 
 89  SAGD is the most common form of in-situ extraction.  WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra 
note 7, at 12. 
 90  Id. at 13. 
 91  Id. at 14. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 11–12.  Further adding to the resource intensiveness of oil sands drilling, one 
barrel of synthetic crude only fills three-fourths of the gas tank of a common pickup truck.  
Id. at 14. 
 94  Id. at 15. 
 95  WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 15. 
 96  Id. at 19. 
 97  Jeremy van Loon, Oil-Sands CO2 to Match Conventional in a Decade, Suncor CEO 
Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2011, 8:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-
06/oil-sands-co2-to-match-conventional-in-decade-suncor-ceo-says.html. 
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Canada’s overall greenhouse gas output, which is already well above the 
levels that the country pledged to maintain when it ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol (Kyoto) in 2002.
98
  While the oil sands industry alone is not to 
blame, Alberta produces one-third of all of Canada’s greenhouse gas 
emissions while only having 10% of the country’s population.99 
The oil sands industry has also been linked to other environmental 
issues.  Deforestation is implicated, for instance, as Alberta’s oil sands 
deposits are located below boreal forests that must be leveled in order to 
allow for strip mining and in-situ recovery.
100
 Water pollution is also a 
concern.  Here, the primary culprits are tailings ponds, which hold the 
slurry of water, fine clay, and silt left over from the bitumen-extraction 
process.
101
  Some leftover bitumen also remains in this mixture, and in its 
post-treatment form this bitumen is toxic to aquatic life and migratory 
birds.
102
  Like frac ponds in the shale context, tailings ponds are very large, 




There is some degree of concern within the scientific community that 
contamination from tailings ponds will eventually be toxic to humans.
104
  
However, at least in the status quo, there appears to be little evidence of 
such direct harm.
105
  Rather, the incremental environmental harms 
stemming from Alberta’s oil sands industry can best be described as “death 
by a thousand cuts.”106 
In any event, environmental concerns have not stopped the oil sands 
industry from becoming successful enough for many to believe that 
government incentives are no longer needed.
107
  Today, there is a great deal 
 
 98  See Stepan Wood et al., Whatever Happened to Canadian Environmental Law?, 37 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 981, 1008–09 (2010) (discussing how far off Canada is from being able to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 6% below their 1990 levels, as it promised under 
Kyoto). 
 99  Teresa Meadows & Tony Crossman, A Tale of Two Provinces: Imposing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Constraints Through Law and Policy in Alberta and British Columbia, 47 
ALTA. L. REV. 421, 426 (2010). 
 100 WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 36–37. 
 101 Id. at 30–31. 
 102 Id. at 31. 
 103 Id. at 30. 
 104 See David Biello, Oil-Sands Raise Levels of Cancer-Causing Compounds in Regional 
Waters, SCI. AM. (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=oil-
sands-raise-levels-of-carcinogens-in-regional-waters. 
 105 The Pembina Institute, a respected research organization and authority on the oil 
sands, does not list any direct harm to humans in its 2005 report.  See generally id. at 19–25, 
27–52 (noting broader environmental impacts). 
 106 Id. at 27. 
 107 See, e.g., WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 59 (arguing that the initial economic 
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of foreign and domestic merger activity in the oil sands sector.
108
  While 
during the 1970s only two Canadian energy companies operated in the oil 
sands,
109
 today more than 900 firms from the United States alone play some 
role in Alberta’s energy sector.110 
Alberta’s residents have been the beneficiaries of this rapid growth.  
As of 2011, the province’s oil and gas sector directly employed about 
271,000 people, while also supporting “hundreds of thousands of indirect 
jobs in sectors such as construction, manufacturing[,] and financial 
services.”111  This employment boost kept Alberta’s unemployment rate for 
that same year at 5.6%–1.7% lower than Canada’s overall unemployment 
rate.
112
  Indeed, the oil sands have arguably helped Canada’s national 
economy rebound from the 2007–2009 financial crisis, as the country’s 
focus on energy in part spurred a growth rate higher than that of the United 
States in 2010 and 2011.
113
 
Ultimately, both the Prime Minister of Canada
114
 and Alison Redford, 
elected premier of Alberta in late 2011, have declared their support for 
continued oil sands development.
115
  This support no doubt informs the 
 
subsidies provided at the provincial and state levels “are still in place today although the 
industry has attained an undeniable level of economic sustainability”); Vanderklippe & Tait, 
supra note 77 (“[T]he [federal] government is of the view that with oil prices where they are, 
the industry is quite healthy.  And it would appear to be their view that corporations don’t 
need the same rapid writeoffs they’ve had in the past . . . .”). 
 108 See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, Sinopec to Buy Daylight Energy for $2.1 Billion, 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 9, 2011, 6:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sinopec-to-
buy-daylight-energy-for-2-1-billion/; Chris V. Nicholson, Cnooc to Pay $2.1 Billion for 
Canadian Oil Sands Firm, DEALBOOK (July 20, 2011, 7:57 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/cnooc-to-pay-2-1-billion-for-canadian-oil-sands-
firm/; Jeremy van Loon, Canada Shifts Toward China with $15 Billion Nexen Deal, 
BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2012, 12:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
23/canada-shifts-toward-china-with-15-billion-nexen-bid.html. 
 109 WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; Oil Sands History, SYNCRUDE CAN. LTD., 
http://www.syncrude.ca/users/folder.asp?FolderID=5657 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 110 O’Grady, supra note 17. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. (discussing growth rates for the two countries in 2010 and an International 
Monetary Fund growth rate projection for 2011 that put Canada ahead once more). 
 114 See Egan, supra note 13. 
 115 See, e.g., Chris Selley, Alison Redford Brings Conciliatory Oil Sands Pitch to Ontario, 
NAT’L POST (Nov. 16, 2011, 7:20 PM) (Can.), 
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/11/16/chris-selley-alison-redford-brings-
conciliatory-oil-sands-pitch-to-ontario/ (discussing Redford giving thanks to the province of 
Ontario for investing in the oil sands, and coming close to “kiboshing any future carbon 
capture and storage projects” while speaking to reporters); Dawn Walton, Western Premiers 
Push Plan to Showcase Canada as “Energy Powerhouse,” GLOBE & MAIL 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/western-premiers-push-plan-to-showcase-
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restrictiveness of regulations that implicate the Canadian oil sands sector. 
III.  CURRENT REGULATORY REGIMES IN PENNSYLVANIA AND 
ALBERTA 
Overall, the regulatory regimes governing the extraction of natural gas 
in Pennsylvania and oil in Alberta reflect a concern over the negative health 
and environmental impacts of each industry on its respective region.  These 
regimes each also consist of a mix of federal, state/provincial, and even sub-
state/provincial laws.  These laws will be discussed in greater depth below. 
A.  Pennsylvania 
1.  Federal Laws 
When it comes to regulating the oil and gas industry, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the central actor at the federal 
level.  The EPA’s enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
has the potential to significantly constrain the extraction of shale gas in 
Pennsylvania.
116
  The EPA also conducts research on the environmental 
harms associated with fracking that has the potential to inform its future 
regulatory position.  These issues will be discussed below. 
 
canada-as-energy-powerhouse/article2269984/ (last updated Sept. 6, 2012, 11:02 AM) 
(discussing Redford’s leadership of a coalition consisting of herself and the premiers of 
Saskatchewan and British Columbia for the purpose of lobbying the federal government to 
develop a national strategy around showcasing the Canadian energy sector). 
 116  The EPA also enforces another law that impacts the shale gas industry in 
Pennsylvania—the Clean Water Act (CWA).  MARY TIEMANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42333, MARCELLUS SHALE GAS: DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL AND WATER 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND LAWS 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/12-1-27-crs-marcellus-shale-gas-
development-potential-issues-laws.pdf.  However, as it applies to this industry, the CWA 
appears primarily directed towards regulating the discharge of now-potable wastewater (like 
spent fracking fluid) into streams and rivers.  Id. at 20; see also Regulation of Hydraulic 
Fracturing Under the Safe Water Drinking Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydroreg.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing].  The facilities 
that process, clean, and then discharge spent fracking fluid are publicly owned treatment 
works or private waste treatment facilities that are usually neither owned nor otherwise 
affiliated with the drillers themselves.  TIEMANN ET AL., supra note 116, at 19.  These 
facilities are often ill-equipped to properly process spent fracking fluid, but that is typically a 
non-issue, as many major drillers intend to recycle and re-use at least 90% of the flowback 
from their fracking operations.  Id. at 22 (discussing the practices of six drillers that, when 
combined, hold more than half of all natural gas drilling permits in the state of 
Pennsylvania).  Thus, the CWA does not appear to be a major hurdle for this Comment’s 
hypothetical fossil fuel developer. 
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i.  Safe Drinking Water Act 
Through the power granted to it under section 1421 of the SDWA, the 
EPA can regulate the underground injection of fluid for the purpose of 
protecting drinking water.
117
  The ability to create specific regulations for 
underground injection lies in the hands of either individual states or the 
EPA itself.
118
  In Pennsylvania, the EPA has retained primacy in crafting 
regulations for wells associated with oil and gas production.
119
  The EPA’s 
minimum permitting standards require drillers to, among other things, 
submit annual reports, pressure-test infrastructure to maintain well integrity, 
space wells at least one-fourth of a mile apart, and monitor flow rate and 
cumulative pressure of underground injection.
120
  Rule violators face both 
civil and criminal penalties, with the maximum civil penalty in some cases 
being as high as $25,000 per day.
121
  Finally, individual citizens also have 
the right to launch civil suits against rule violators (and indeed, even the 
EPA itself, for a failure to enforce its own rules) under the SDWA.
122
 
Those in the business of extracting unconventional fossil fuels, 
however, currently have little to fear from SDWA’s penalties.  Amended by 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, section 1421 of the SDWA now mandates 
that the definition of “underground injection” exclude fluids used in the 
fracking process other than diesel fuels.
123
  Thus, fracking as it pertains to 




 117 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2011) (“Regulations of the Administrator under this section for 
State underground injection control programs may not prescribe requirements which 
interfere with or impede (A) the underground injection of brine or other fluids which are 
brought to the surface in connection with oil or natural gas production or natural gas storage 
operations, or (B) any underground injection for the secondary or tertiary recovery of oil or 
natural gas, unless such requirements are essential to assure that underground sources of 
drinking water will not be endangered by such injection.”) (emphasis added); see also 
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 116. 
 118 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1. 
 119 TIEMANN ET AL.,  supra note 115, at 28. 
 120 MARY TIEMANN & ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41760, HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING AND SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT ISSUES 12 (2012), available at 
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R41760.pdf. 
 121 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2. 
 122 Id. § 300j-8. 
 123 Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 322 (2005). 
 124 The SDWA’s position on fracking appears to be an about-face from the U.S. 
government’s stance from nearly a decade earlier, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that fracking in coal beds for the purposes of extracting methane gas 
did constitute an activity regulated under the SDWA.  See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. 
EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).  In Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., the court 
held that coal-bed fracking was not exempt from the Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
program established by the EPA pursuant to the SDWA and implemented by the state of 
Alabama.  Id.; see also Sakmar, supra note 21, at 409.  Unlike Pennsylvania, Alabama has 
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 was no doubt influenced by an EPA 
report on fracking published a year earlier.
125
  In this report, the EPA 
analyzed peer-reviewed articles and surveyed numerous government 
employees and concerned citizens
126
 before concluding that it could find no 
evidence that fracking in coal beds (for the purpose of releasing and 
collecting methane gas) contaminated nearby sources of drinking water.
127
  
The finding was “roundly criticized” for not completely studying the issue, 




More recently, the EPA has begun revisiting the issue of fracking.  In 
response to the growth of fracking in the natural gas sector, the U.S. House 
of Representatives in 2010 issued a directive to the EPA urging another 
study on fracking and its impact on drinking water.
129
  The EPA is currently 
in the process of conducting this study, with a report on interim results due 
in 2012.
130
  The EPA expects to release a final draft report for public 
comment and peer review in 2014.
131
 
In any case, interim EPA actions have not displayed a reformed 
attitude toward fracking.  For instance, in 2011, after it found a link 
between contaminated groundwater and fracking in Wyoming, the EPA 
agreed to delay public announcement of this finding at the behest of the 
state’s government.132  This gave opponents of the study time to “coordinate 
 
been granted primacy to enforce the SDWA by the EPA.  See Sakmar, supra note 21, at 408. 
 125 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO 
UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED 
METHANE RESERVOIRS (2004), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_coalbedmethanes
tudy.cfm. 
 126 See id. at 2-3 to 2-5 (“EPA researched more than 200 peer-reviewed publications, 
interviewed approximately 50 employees from industry and state or local government 
agencies, and communicated with approximately 40 citizens and groups who [were] 
concerned that CBM production affected their drinking water wells.”). 
 127 Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science and the Reasonable Development of Marcellus Shale 
Natural Gas Resources in Pennsylvania and New York, 32 ENERGY L.J. 125, 135 (2011) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 128 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129 See Memorandum from Fred S. Hauchman, Dir., Office of Sci. Policy to Edward 
Hanlon, Designated Fed. Officer, EPA Sci. Advisory Bd. Staff, Request for Review of the 
Draft Plan to Study the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic on Drinking Water Sources (Feb. 7, 
2011), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/SAB-Revew-Request-Final-2-8-11.pdf. 
 130 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER SOURCES viii (2011), available at 
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/HFStudyPlanDraft_SAB_020711.pdf. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Mead Gruver, EPA Fracking Study Announcement Was Delayed by Wyoming 
Officials, HUFFINGTON POST (May 3, 2012, 7:35 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/03/epa-fracking-study-wyoming-
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[an] all-out press” against its findings,133 which the EPA subsequently 
agreed to subject to a retest.
134
  Interestingly enough, the EPA also recently 
found drinking water in Pennsylvania that it had formerly considered 
contaminated, now safe.
135
  Thus, the final result of Congress’ 2010 
directive to the EPA remains to be seen. 
ii.  Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act 
Congress has also attempted to act itself for the purpose of regulating 
the shale gas industry.  In 2009, Representative Diana DeGette of Colorado 
and Senator Robert (Bob) Casey of Pennsylvania introduced the Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act) in the House 
of Representatives
136
 and Senate, respectively.
137
  The FRAC Act was 
aimed at revising the SDWA to expressly include fracking fluids in its 
purview and require natural gas drilling companies to disclose the types of 
chemicals (but not propriety formulas) used in their fracking fluids.
138
  
Ultimately, however, the Act failed to reach the floor of the House before 
 
delayed_n_1475270.html. 
 133 See id.; Mead Gruver, EPA Fracking Report on Wyoming Water Doesn’t End Debate, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2011, 4:20 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/09/epa-fracking-report-wyoming-
water_n_1138482.html (“Sen. James Inhofe called the study ‘not based on sound science but 
rather on political science.  Its findings are premature, given that the Agency has not gone 
through the necessary peer-review process, and there are still serious outstanding questions 
regarding EPA’s data and methodology,’ the Oklahoma Republican said.”). 
 134 Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, EPA Backpedals on Fracking Contamination, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2012, 1:47 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577313741463447670.html.  
Nevertheless, the EPA’s subsequent retest again established a link between fracking and the 
contaminated groundwater.  See Mark Drajem, Wyoming Water Tests in Line with EPA 
Finding on Fracking, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-10/epa-says-test-of-wyoming-water-
consistent-with-prior-results. 
 135 Gilbert & Gold, supra note 134. 
 136 See generally Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 137 See generally Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 
1215, 111th Cong. (2009).  Both the Senate and House proposals have been collectively 
dubbed the “FRAC Act” by the media.  See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, FRAC Act—Congress 
Introduces Twin Bills to Control Drilling and Protect Drinking Water, PROPUBLICA (June 9, 
2009, 11:31 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/frac-act-congress-introduces-bills-to-
control-drilling-609. 
 138 H.R. 2766 § 2; S. 1215 § 2.  Although the language of the Senate bill goes beyond its 
House counterpart by seeking to define “underground injection” as the “subsurface 
emplacement of fluids by well injection” S. 1215 § 2, both bills have the same general 
purpose with respect to amending section 1421 of the SDWA.  H.R. 2766 § 2; S. 1215 § 2. 
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the 111th Congress recessed.
139
  The 2010 mid-term election was credited 
with killing the Bill.
140
  Senator Casey and Representative DeGette have 
reintroduced the FRAC Act in the Senate and House during the 112th 
Congress,
141




2.  State/Local Laws 
A number of actors outside the federal government share in the 
regulation of Pennsylvania’s share of the Marcellus Shale: the State of 
Pennsylvania, local Pennsylvania municipalities, and the Delaware River 
Basin Commission (DRBC), an entity that has jurisdiction in multiple 
states.  These actors often have differing views on the benefits and 
drawbacks of shale drilling.  Some degree of regulatory uncertainty has 
been the result. 
i.  Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act 
Enacted in 1984 and most recently amended in 2012,
143
 the 
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act (Oil and Gas Act) is the linchpin to the 
State’s regulation of the shale gas industry.144  The Act gives the 
 
 139 See Sakmar, supra note 21, at 410–11. 
 140 Joshua B. Pribanic, EPA Finds Way to Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing, PUB. HERALD 
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.publicherald.org/archives/11388/investigative-reports/energy-
investigations/. 
 141 See Laura Legere, Casey Reintroduces Natural Gas Bills, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/gas-drilling/casey-reintroduces-natural-
gas-bills-1.1119578#axzz1GmGpdvBy; Benjamin Haas et al., Fracking Hazards Obscured 
in Failure to Disclose Wells, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:26 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/fracking-hazards-obscured-in-failure-to-
disclose-wells.html. 
 142 See FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011); Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness 
of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011).  The initial steps of the 
legislative process include committee-based deliberation, investigation, and revision of the 
bill.  See The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 143 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3201 (2012).  The recent amendments to the Oil and Gas Act 
will be discussed at length in this Part. 
 144 This is not to say, however, that the Oil and Gas Act is the only hurdle for shale 
developers at the state-law level.  The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA) 
may also be an option for opponents of fracking.  Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA), 
1988 Pa. Laws 756.  In ongoing litigation under the HSCA, for instance, landowners have 
alleged that Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation “improperly conducted hydrofracturing and 
other natural gas production activities that allowed the release of methane, natural gas, and 
other toxins onto [the plaintiffs’] land and into their groundwater.”  Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil 
& Gas, 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010).  The plaintiffs have so far survived the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Id.  In denying that motion, the court found that the plaintiffs 
had brought an actionable claim under section 1115 of the HSCA, which provides that “[a] 
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Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) the authority 
to regulate several areas critical to shale drilling, from permitting 
requirements
145
 and well location restrictions
146





  The DEP also has the authority to inspect well 
sites for the purpose of responding to complaints about water quality and 
contamination.
149
  The Act institutes both civil and criminal penalties for 
rule violations.
150
  The DEP, however, appears to rely only on fines.
151
  
From January 1, 2012 through October 29, 2012, the DEP inspected 326 
unique unconventional wells, found 628 rule violations, and issued fines for 
fewer than thirty of these violations.
152
 
Importantly, the Oil and Gas Act claims to supersede any local 
ordinances that “impose conditions, requirements or limitations on the same 
features of oil and gas operations regulated by [the Act].”153  This provision 
 
person who has experienced or is threatened with personal injury or property damage as a 
result of a release of a hazardous substance may file a civil action against any person to 
prevent or abate a violation of this act or of any order, regulation, standard or approval listed 
under this act.”  HSCA § 1115, 1988 Pa. Laws 815..  Nevertheless, the court has yet to rule 
on the merits of this case, leaving the HSCA largely unproven as a regulatory weapon.  This 
Comment views the Oil and Gas Act as much more of a threat to drillers—enough by itself 
to give any prospective investor pause. 
 145 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211 (2012). 
 146 Id. § 3215. 
 147 Id. § 3225. 
 148 Id. § 3220. 
 149 Id. § 3218. 
 150 Id. §§ 3255–3256. 
 151 For example, the Oil and Gas Compliance Report, available on the DEP’s website, 
shows fines as a possible outcome from an inspection, but makes no mention of criminal 
penalties.  DEP Office of Oil and Gas Management Compliance Report, PA. DEPT. ENVTL. 
PROT., 
http://www.depreportingservices.state.pa.us/ReportServer/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?/Oil_G
as/OG_Compliance (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).  Additionally, running this report for all 
compliance violations in unconventional wells from January 1, 2012, to October 29, 2012, 
yields only fines for violations, and no criminal penalties.  Id. (inputting January 1, 2012, 
and October 29, 2012, as start and end dates for the report, selecting unconventional wells 
only, selecting inspections with violations only, and running the report). 
 152 Id.  The largest fine levied by the DEP during this period was $12,500, for overdue 
drilling records.  Id.  As recently as 2011, however, the DEP levied a fine of over $1 million 
to a driller.  See Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Fines Chesapeake Energy 
More than $1 Million (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=17405&typei
d=1.  Here the DEP fined driller Chesapeake Energy for contaminating private water 
supplies near one of its well pads and experiencing a tank fire at another.  Id. 
 153 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012) (“Except with respect to local ordinances adopted 
pursuant to the MPC and the . . . Flood Plain Management Act, all local ordinances 
purporting to regulate oil and gas operations regulated by Chapter 32 (relating to 
development) are hereby superseded.  No local ordinance adopted pursuant to the MPC or 
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prevents municipal ordinances from accomplishing the same purposes of 
the Act.
154
  However, it also suggests that municipal ordinances can address 
facets of the shale drilling industry not addressed by the Oil and Gas Act. 
This duality in the Oil and Gas Act’s supersession clause has been a 
source of controversy and litigation in Pennsylvania.  The Act, for example, 
does not cover “[p]ractical issues such as noise, fencing, security, traffic, 
and dust.”155  Nor does it address the ability of municipalities to use zoning 
restrictions to limit shale gas extraction within their borders.
156
  These gaps 
in the Oil and Gas Act have been filled by local ordinances.
157
  These local 
rules not only have had the effect of limiting shale industry development in 
specific municipalities, but they also have the potential, collectively, to 
complicate the shale gas extraction process to the point that the Marcellus 





the Flood Plain Management Act shall contain provisions which impose conditions, 
requirements or limitations on the same features of oil and gas operations regulated by 
Chapter 32 or that accomplish the same purposes as set forth in Chapter 32.  The 
Commonwealth, by this section, preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas 
operations as provided in this chapter.”).  This language is functionally identical to the 
language of the Oil and Gas Act’s supersession provision prior to the Act’s amendment in 
2012.  See S. 402, 1984 Reg. Sess. § 602 (as passed by Pa. Senate and House, Nov. 28, 1984) 
(repealed 2012) (“Except with respect to ordinances adopted pursuant to . . . the 
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, and . . . the Flood Plain Management Act, all 
local ordinances and enactments purporting to regulate oil and gas well operations regulated 
by this act are hereby superseded.  No ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the 
aforementioned acts shall contain provisions which impose conditions, requirements or 
limitations on the same features of oil and gas well operations regulated by this act or that 
accomplish the same purposes as set forth in this act.  The Commonwealth, by this 
enactment, hereby preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas wells as herein 
defined.”).  The litigation over the Oil and Gas Act’s supersession provision discussed in this 
Part is based on the Act’s pre-2012 language. 
 154 See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012). 
 155 Smith, supra note 14, at 13. 
 156 See Alerts and Updates: Wiggle Room for Marcellus Gas Drilling, or Potentially 
Reversible Error?, DUANE MORRIS LLP (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/local_regulation_marcellus_shale_drilling_3771.html. 
 157 See Erich Schwartzel, Marcellus Shale Driller Fighting South Fayette Ordinance, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2012, 3:43 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/11229/1167781-503.stm?cmpid=business.xml (“Throughout Western 
Pennsylvania, townships have passed ordinances that further regulate drilling beyond state 
law or take steps to mitigate side effects like road damage or noise control.”); Maher, supra 
note 52 (“In the past 18 months, more than 100 Pennsylvania municipalities have enacted 
ordinances to limit or regulate such drilling.  Local officials say such restrictions fall within a 
town’s right to enforce zoning, much in the same way municipalities can prevent a chemical 
plant or prison from being built in the middle of a residential neighborhood.”); Smith, supra 
note 14, at 13. 
 158 See Maher, supra note 52 (“‘We want something that’s fair and reasonable,’ said John 
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Currently, the ability of municipalities to regulate shale industry 
development is supported by Pennsylvania courts.  In 2009, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in Huntley & Huntley v. Council of 
Oakmont, that a local zoning ordinance preventing a gas driller from 
operating in a residential area was not preempted by the Oil and Gas Act.
159
  
Here, the court found that preemption only covered local laws similar to the 
Oil and Gas Act with respect to the “technical aspects of well functioning 
and matters ancillary thereto (such as registration, bonding, and well site 
restoration), rather than the well’s location.”160  The Oil and Gas Act could 
not be used to preempt a local law seeking “only to control the location of 
wells consistent with established zoning principles.”161 
The Pennsylvania government’s response to such Oil and Gas Act 
litigation has been relatively swift.  In late 2011, both branches of the 
Pennsylvania legislature adopted bills seeking to update the Oil and Gas 
Act.
162
  These bills eventually became Act 13, which was signed into law in 
early 2012.
163
  Act 13 seeks revenue from energy companies in the form of 
impact fees for individual wells
164
 and, importantly, has the effect of 
restricting the ability of municipalities to implement zoning ordinances 
 
Pinkerton, CEO of Fort Worth-based Range Resources Corp. He said developing the 
Marcellus is proving more complicated than other shale plays in part because of the greater 
number of municipalities in a state like Pennsylvania.  ‘It’s like having to have a different 
drivers (sic) license in every township.  You just can’t run a business that way.’”). 
 159 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009); Smith, supra note 14, at 13–15. 
 160 Huntley & Huntley v. Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 2009). 
 161 Smith, supra note 14, at 17.  This is to be compared with Range Resources-
Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Salem Twp., where a local ordinance establishing a permit fee for oil 
and gas drilling was struck down under Oil and Gas Act preemption for impermissibly 
encroaching on the Act’s purposes, “broadly speaking,” of “optimizing oil and gas 
development, ensuring the safety of the personnel and facilities used in such development, 
protecting the property rights of neighboring landowners, and preserving the natural 
environment.”  964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 2009).  Huntley’s view of Oil and Gas Act 
preemption was subsequently applied in Penneco Oil v. County of Fayette.  4 A.3d 722, 732 
(Pa. 2010) (“As in Huntley, we conclude that while there may be some overlap between the 
goals of Fayette County’s Zoning Ordinance and the purposes set forth in the Act, the most 
salient objectives underlying restrictions on oil and gas drilling in certain zoning districts 
appears in Fayette County to be those pertaining to preserving the character of residential 
neighborhoods, as well as each zoning district, and encouraging beneficial and compatible 
land uses.”). 
 162 S. 1100, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); H.R. 1950, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011). 
 163 See TERI OOMS ET. AL, EVOLUTION OF HB 1950 AND SB 1100—PENNSYLVANIA’S 
MARCELLUS SHALE IMPACT FEE—AND ASSESSMENT OF HB 1950 (ACT 13), at 1, 3 (2012), 
available at 
http://energy.wilkes.edu/PDFFiles/Act%2013%20Assessment%2003%2019%202012.pdf. 
 164 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2012).  The lowest possible fee (with levels depending on 
the price of natural gas) for a well in its first year of operation is $40,000, with fees 
decreasing as the age of the well increases.  Id. 






Specifically, under Act 13, Pennsylvania municipalities are granted the 
right to impose impact fees on any wells operating in their jurisdiction.
166
  
These impact fees may be paired with municipal zoning ordinances, so long 
as the ordinances do not infringe on the “reasonable development of oil and 
gas.”167  Per section 3304 of the Act, “reasonable development” explicitly 
authorizes “oil and gas operations—other than activities at impoundment 
areas, compressor stations, and processing plants—as a permitted use in all 
zoning districts.”168  Impoundment areas, compressor stations, and 
processing plants are also allowed, with the appropriate setbacks from other 
buildings.
169
  If the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or a 
Pennsylvania state court rules that a municipality is unreasonably restricting 
development, the municipality will be unable to receive any of the impact 
fee revenue until the ordinance is changed.
170
  Nor will a municipality 
receive any revenue if it refuses to impose an impact fee.
171
  The ultimate 
goal, at least in the eyes of Pennsylvania’s Republican Governor, Tom 
Corbett, is to use the impact fee as leverage for streamlining local laws in 
the name of encouraging natural gas development and creating more jobs.
172
 
Nevertheless, opponents of Act 13 still have hope.  In July 2012, an 
appellate panel of judges for the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
voted to enjoin the State from enforcing section 3304 of the Act on federal 
 
 165 See Thomas Y. Au, Op-Ed., Legislators Would be Wise to Start Over with Marcellus 
Shale Bill, PENNLIVE (Dec. 30, 2011, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.ssf/2011/12/legislators_would_be_wise_to_s.html; 
Marc Levy, Associated Press, GOP Lawmakers Seek Vote on Pa. Drilling Bill, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 5, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/05/pennsylvania-
natural-gas-drilling-bill_n_1255759.html; Marc Levy, Associated Press, Pennsylvania Act 
13 Provisions Struck Down by Appellate Court, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2012, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/pennsylvania-act-13-natural-
gas_n_1706822.html; Sandy Long, PA Legislation Could Trade Community Control for 
Drilling Fees, RIVER REP. (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.riverreporteronline.com/news/14/2011/11/15/pa-legislation-could-trade-
community-control-drilling-fees; Robert Swift, House, Senate Hammer Out Impact Fee 
Bills, CITIZENS VOICE (Feb. 5, 2012), http://citizensvoice.com/news/house-senate-hammer-
out-impact-fee-bills-1.1267318#axzz1lVJfiCim. 
 166 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302(a) (2012). 
 167 Id. § 3304. 
 168 Id. § 3304(b)(5). 
 169 Id. § 3304(b)(6)–(8). 
 170 Id. § 3308. 
 171 Id. § 2302. 
 172 See Long, supra note 165 (quoting the Governor as saying: “There are job creators 
well down the supply chain in the Marcellus Shale industry who are waiting to see if 
Pennsylvania will enact predicable and uniform standards before making capital investments 
in the Commonwealth. I do not want to make these job creators, nor these potential capital 
investments, wait any longer”). 
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and state constitutional grounds.
173
  Specifically, in Robinson Twp. v. 
Commonwealth, the panel found that section 3304’s authorization of oil and 
gas operations in all zoning districts violated the substantive due process of 
Pennsylvania municipalities, as “it [did] not protect the interests of 
neighboring property owners from harm, alter[ed] the character of 
neighborhoods, and [made] irrational classifications” for what must be 
included in zoning areas.
174
  The ruling was seen as a win for local 
governance and those opposed to further development of the Marcellus 




Predictably, proponents of Act 13 demanded a speedy review of the 
Commonwealth Court’s decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.176  
This review was held on October 17, 2012, with the Supreme Court 
listening to nearly two hours of arguments both for and against Act 13 in a 
hearing open to the public.
177
  There is no timeline for the court’s final 




ii.  Delaware River Basin Commission 
In contrast to the regulatory flux surrounding the Oil and Gas Act, the 
policies of the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), a non-federal, 
interstate regulatory body, are at least for the time being a concrete obstacle 
to Pennsylvania’s shale drillers.  Created by the Delaware River Basin 
Compact of 1961,
179
 the DRBC is “a regional body with the force of law” 
tasked with regulating the portion of the Delaware River system located 
within the Commission’s constituent states of Delaware, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania.
180
  There are five commissioners of the DRBC: the 
 
 173 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
 174 Id. at 484.  The court went on to state: “If a municipality cannot constitutionally 
include allowing oil and gas operations, it is no more constitutional just because the 
Commonwealth requires that it be done.”  Id. at 485. 
 175 See Levy, supra note 165. 
 176 Laura Olson, Pa. Officials Seek Review of Act 13 Shale Drilling Ruling, PITTSBURG 
POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 1, 2012, 12:16 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/pa-officials-seek-review-of-act-31-shale-drilling-
ruling-647058/. 
 177 Laura Olson, Justices Hear Opinions on Marcellus Shale Drilling Law, PITTSBURG 
POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 18, 2012, 12:04 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/justices-hear-opinions-on-marcellus-shale-drilling-
law-657952/. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). 
 180 About DRBC, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, http://www.nj.gov/drbc/about/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2012). 
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governor of each constituent state and the commander of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers North Atlantic Division, who serves as the federal 
representative.
181
  The Delaware River Basin cuts through a wide swath of 
central Pennsylvania that, importantly, is subject to an ongoing DRBC 
moratorium on shale drilling.
182
 
Specifically, in May 2009, the DRBC banned any new shale gas 
drilling in the Delaware River Basin without prior Commission approval, 
while simultaneously announcing that no new approvals would be granted 
until the Commission had adopted new rules governing approvals.
183
  
According to DRBC Executive Director Carol R. Collier, the genesis of the 
moratorium was a concern with shale drilling’s effect on water quality.184  
This concern was no doubt informed by the fact that the Delaware River 
Basin is responsible for the water supply of over 15 million people, 
including all of Philadelphia and half of New York City.
185
 
In this context, the DRBC issued draft fracking regulations in 
December 2010.
186
  However, DRBC commissioners never voted on these 
regulations, and a continuous flow of public comment and environmental 
concern has kept votes on subsequent drafts from occurring.
187
  The most 
current DRBC draft regulations would allow for the drilling of a maximum 
of 300 natural gas wells collectively between all energy companies 
permitted to operate in the Delaware River Basin.
188
  The vote on this draft 
was postponed indefinitely from its already-delayed date of November 21, 
2011, after Delaware Governor Jack Markell announced his intention to 
join the state of New York in voting against the draft regulations.
189
  In 
postponing the vote, the DRBC claimed that it was allowing “additional 
time for review by the five commission members.”190  It was an event that 
 
 181 Commissioners, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/commissioners/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
 182 Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/natural/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
 183 McKay et al., supra note 127, at 131. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Associated Press, DRBC Tweaks Proposed Gas Drilling Regulations, WALL ST. J.  
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP7f80ad53e651483eb2130415309ab5cb.html. 
 186 See McKay et al., supra note 127, at 131–32. 
 187 In postponing its vote over the latest iteration of draft regulations from October 21, 
2011 to November 21, 2011, the DRBC noted that it had received 69,000 public submissions 
and comments.  See Amanda Cregan, Vote Delayed on Drilling Regulations, 
PHILLYBURBS.COM (Oct. 9, 2011, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.phillyburbs.com/my_town/new_hope/vote-delayed-on-drilling-
regulations/article_899fa507-e1dd-510a-b5d4-8a10480bf6a1.html. 
 188 Associated Press, supra note 185. 
 189 Gerken, supra note 53. 
 190 Press Release, Del. River Basin Comm’n, DRBC Postpones November 21 Special 
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many anti-drilling activists considered a victory.
191
 
B.  Alberta 
1.  Federal Laws 
The Canadian Constitution gives the federal and provincial-level 
governments differing authority when it comes to the oil and gas industry.  
Specifically, provinces have the exclusive right to regulate their own non-
renewable natural resources,
192
 while the federal government is responsible 
for issues relating to “fisheries, shipping, interprovincial trade and 
commerce, and criminal law.”193  Thus, the federal government’s ability to 
regulate the environmental effects of the oil sands industry is constrained by 
the Alberta provincial government’s constitutional authority. 
i.  Kyoto Protocol 
Despite its constitutional constraints, the Canadian federal government 
could have, at least in theory, reigned in the oil sands industry by regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to its obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Specifically, pursuant to Kyoto, Canada pledged to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions to at least 6% below their 1990 levels by 2012.
194
  
However, with compliance by the end of 2012 looking increasing 
impossible given its emissions output, Canada in late 2011 announced it 
was pulling out of the agreement, thereby limiting its impetus to regulate 




Meeting: New Meeting Date Still to be Determined (Nov. 18, 
2011), http://www.nj.gov/drbc/home/newsroom/news/approved/20111118_newsrel_naturalg
as.html. 
 191 Gerken, supra note 53. 
 192 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 92A (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. 
II, no. 5 (Can.) (“In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to 
(a) exploration for non-renewable resources in the province; (b) development, conservation 
and management of non-renewable resources and forestry resources in the province, 
including laws in relation to the rate of primary production therefrom; and (c) development, 
conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the generation and 
production of electrical energy.”). 
 193 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., 2011 OCTOBER REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 63 (2011), available at 
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201110_02_e.pdf; see also Constitution 
Act c. 91. 
 194 Wood et al., supra note 98. 
 195 Ian Austen, Canada Announces Exit From Kyoto Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 2011, at A15 (“Canada could meet its commitment only through extreme measures, like 
pulling all motor vehicles from its roads and shutting heat off to every building in the 
country.”); see also Wood et al., supra note 98. 
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The decision to abandon Kyoto came as a surprise to few, as in the 
short term the Canadian government saved itself from at least $6 billion in 
fines it would have accrued for non-compliance.
196
  Further, the move 
reflected the long-held, anti-Kyoto stance of the country’s Conservative 
Party, which currently controls the federal government.
197
  Indeed, ever 
since coming into power in 2006, current Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
government has been “overtly hostile” to Kyoto, instituting only “soft” pro-
Kyoto measures such as a Green Infrastructure Fund targeted at funding 
public transit and other similar ventures.
198
 
Underlying the Harper administration’s attitude toward Kyoto and its 
relationship to the oil sands is the concept of “ethical oil.”199  This concept 
essentially posits that the oil produced in democratic countries such as 
Canada is morally preferable to “conflict oil” produced in countries with 
poor human rights records.
200
  The Canadian government planned to invoke 
the “ethical oil” concept at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties, the 
governing body of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
201
 in order to 
justify Canada’s heightened emissions.202  This suggests that there may be 
 
 196 $6 billion is the low estimate for the amount Canada would have owed, per the 
Pembina Institute; the high estimate, per the Minister of the Environment Peter Kent, is $14 
billion.  Austen, supra note 195. 
 197 Kyoto was ratified under the rule of the opposing Liberal Party.  Id. 
 198 Wood et al., supra note 98, at 1010.  The Green Infrastructure Fund was created in 
2009 and, per the Canadian government, is designed to support projects that “promote 
cleaner air, reduced greenhouse gas emissions and cleaner water.”  Green Infrastructure 
Fund, INFRASTRUCTURE CAN., http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/prog/gif-fiv-eng.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2012).  For reference, it should also be noted that the Liberal governments, 
before current Prime Minister Harper, “were very slow to develop climate change policies 
and failed to implement any significant measures before they lost office in 2006.”  Wood et 
al., supra note 98, at 1010. 
 199 See Egan, supra note 13.  The concept of ethical oil was taken from a book recently 
published by Ezra Levant.  See EZRA LEVANT, ETHICAL OIL: THE CASE FOR CANADA’S OIL 
SANDS (2010). 
 200 Trish Audette, Canada to Defend Oilsands at Conference; It’s All or Nothing in 
Reducing Emissions, Minister Says, VICTORIA TIMES COLONIST, Nov. 27, 2011, at A11 
(Can.), available at 2011 WLNR 24551024 (“The book essentially compares Canada’s 
human rights record to those of other oil-producing countries, and argues Canada’s ‘ethical 
oil’ is preferable to ‘conflict oil’ produced in countries with poor human rights records, such 
as Sudan, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia or Iran. The argument removes environmental issues, 
such as greenhouse gas emissions, from the equation, though Levant notes Alberta’s data on 
environmental issues is more transparent than information shared by other countries.”). 
 201 Conference of the Parties (COP), CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.cbd.int/cop/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
 202 Audette, supra note 200.  Interestingly, although the author of the book “Ethical Oil” 
is not affiliated with the government, the government has been so supportive of the concept 
of ethical oil that there has been some controversy over whether the website 
www.ethicaloil.org is government-controlled or not.  Id. 
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little risk of federal regulation under the guise of emissions control at least 
in the near future. 
ii.  Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
Repealed and subsequently re-enacted in mid-2012, the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) gives the federal government a 
somewhat limited degree of power over oil sands development.
203
  
Specifically, the purpose of the CEAA is to ensure that certain “designated 
project[s]” carried out in Canada over which the federal government has 
authority do not cause “significant adverse environmental effects.”204  
These environmental effects are, however, limited to the federal 
government’s direct authority over fish, other aquatic species, and 
migratory birds,
205
 since the federal government has no corresponding 
constitutional authority to directly regulate non-renewable natural 
resources.
206
  Moreover, the federal government cannot review types of 
projects that have not been “designated” as reviewable by Canada’s 
Minister of the Environment.
207
  Current Minister Peter Kent has limited 
reviewable oil sands projects solely to the creation of new processing plants 
producing over 10,000 cubic meters of oil per day,
208
 the expansion of 
existing processing plants by a production capacity of over 5,000 cubic 
meters of oil per day,
209
 and the creation of new mines producing over 
10,000 cubic meters of bitumen per day.
210
 
Upon its enactment, the new CEAA was seen by environmental groups 
as more favorable to developers than its predecessor.
211
  Beyond noting its 
limitations for federal regulation of the oil sands sector, critics also focused 
on new provisions that imposed strict time limits on the environmental 
assessment process, a contemporaneous change to the Canadian Fisheries 
 
 203 See generally Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52 
(Can.); see also Juliet Eilperin, Canadian Government Overhauling Environmental Rules to 
Aid Oil Extraction, WASH. POST (June 3, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/canadian-government-overhauling-
environmental-rules-to-aid-oil-extraction/2012/06/03/gJQAyxx2BV_story.html. 
 204 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act s. 52, art. 4(1)(a). 
 205 See id. art. 5(1)(a)(i)–(iv); 
 206 See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 91, 92A (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.). 
 207 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act s. 52, art. 84(a). 
 208 Regulations Designating Physical Activities, SOR/2012-147, sch., para. 9(a) (Can.). 
 209 Id. para. 12. 
 210 Id. para. 9(b) 
 211 See, e.g., Eilperin, supra note 203; Chris Plecash, Feds Set to Release CEAA 2012 
Regulations, HILL TIMES, July 16, 2012, at 20, available at 
http://www.imperialoil.ca/Canada-English/operations_sands_kearl_overview.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
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Act that narrowed its focus (and thus, the federal government’s ability to 
protect fish via the CEAA) to solely “commercial, recreational and 
aboriginal fisheries,” and a vast reduction in the federal budget for 
environmental assessments.
212
  While there has been successful pro-
environmental litigation in at least one instance under the older iteration of 
the CEAA,
213
 it remains to be seen if the newer version of the law will be 
impacted in a similar manner. 
iii.  Tax Policy 
Federal tax policy presents more of a threat to development than the 
CEAA.  Though, as discussed earlier, the federal government provided 
accelerated cost recovery starting in the late 1990s to encourage oil sands 
development, Stephen Harper’s Conservative administration has recently 




Specifically, the Harper government introduced a proposed budget in 
early 2011 that reduced the speed with which companies could write off 
expenses relating to the acquisition of oil sands leases and the development 
of new oil sands mines.
215
  These rollbacks remained in the 2011 budget 
and were not removed,
216
 even after Harper’s re-election in May 2011.217  
To pro-drilling sources—such as Alberta’s provincial government and the 
oil sands industry’s trade group—such measures risked reducing the 
financial appeal of oil sands development and moving the sector’s tax 




 212 Plecash, supra note 211. 
 213 See Pembina Inst. for Appropriate Dev. v. Can., [2008] F.C. 302 (Can.), available at 
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2008/2008fc302/2008fc302.pdf.  In Pembina Inst. for 
Appropriate Dev., Canada’s highest trial court ruled that the federal government must 
provide a cogent rationale for its conclusion in order to meet CEAA minimum standards for 
conducting an environmental assessment of an oil sands project.  Id. para. 78; see also Toby 
Kruger, Note, The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and Global Climate Change: 
Rethinking Significance, 47 ALTA. L. REV. 161 (2009).  This decision appears to apply to the 
2012 version of the CEAA in the sense that both it and the older version of the law have 
largely identical minimum standards for project review panels.  See Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52, art. 43(1)(d) (Can.); Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 34(c) (Can.) (repealed 2012). 
 214 Vanderklippe & Tait, supra note 77. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See DEP’T OF FIN. CANADA, THE NEXT PHASE OF CANADA’S ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN: 
A LOW-TAX PLAN FOR JOBS AND GROWTH 310–12 (2011), available at 
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/Budget2011-eng.pdf. 
 217 Jeffrey Jones & Janet Guttsman, Canada Tories to Follow a Tax-Cut, Pro-Business 
Agenda, REUTERS (May 3, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-politics-
idUSTRE73Q44720110503. 
 218 Vanderklippe & Tait, supra note 77. 
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At the same time, however, Harper’s rollbacks did not appear to be a 
complete deterrent to companies operating in the oil sands.  First, oil sands 
leases and mines acquired prior to March 22, 2011 were grandfathered in 
under the previous, more favorable tax regime.
219
  Second, many companies 
operating in the oil sands were focusing on developing existing leases and 
mines, and not necessarily on acquiring new assets.
220
  Finally, for some 
companies, tax treatment was not seen as the driving force in oil sands 




Moreover, rollbacks aside, Harper did not indicate that constraining 
Canada’s oil industry was on his agenda after winning the 2011 federal 
election.
222
 This suggests that the pre-election Harper government seemed, 
at most, to view the oil sands sector as a mature industry no longer needing 
tax incentives to encourage investment.
223
  The main calculus in considering 
the elimination of tax breaks, instead, seemed tied to the possibility of 




2.  Provincial/Local Laws 
Canada’s Constitution proclaims that provinces have the exclusive 
right to regulate their own non-renewable natural resources.
225
  However, 
this preferred status has not resulted in a consistent framework regulating 
Alberta’s oil sands as, much like in Pennsylvania, provincial and municipal 
interests have often clashed. 
i.  Resource Licensing 
Regulation of oil sands development usually begins and ends with 
Alberta’s provincial government.  Municipal governments are not 
“consulted in any direct way when the provincial government sets its 
energy policy, establishes land use plans for the province, disposes of rights 
to develop Crown-owned oil and gas resources, or grants access to the 
surface of public lands.”226  The provincial government’s control over the 
 
 219 See DEP’T OF FIN. CANADA, supra note 216, at 311–12. 
 220 Vanderklippe & Tait, supra note 77. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 92A (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. 
II, no. 5 (Can.). 
 226 Nickie Vlavianos & Chidinma Thompson, Alberta’s Approach to Local Governance 
in Oil and Gas Development, 48 ALTA. L. REV. 55, 78 (2010). 
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resource licensing process is significant, as it owns approximately 97% of 
Alberta’s oil sands mineral rights.227  In transferring these rights to potential 
developers, the provincial government traditionally has not been legally 
required to account for socio-economic or environmental concerns.
228
  
Indeed, the process by which the provincial government transfers these 
rights is seemingly devoid of normative factors; instead, the highest bidder 
for advertised public oil and gas rights wins.
229
 
In exchange for access to the provincial oil and gas rights, developers 
pay Alberta “[r]oyalties, bonus bid payments, and rents.”230  This system of 
royalties illustrates where the loyalties of the Alberta government lie when 
it comes to oil sands development and the environment.  As discussed 
earlier, in 1997 the Alberta government imposed a generous royalty regime 
on oil sands projects in order to spur development in this sector.
231
  While 
royalties for the oil and gas industry overall were increased in 2007, and 
thus made more punitive, this change was partially rolled back in early 
2010.
232
  All in all, Alberta’s government seemingly viewed an increase in 
economic activity as being worth a smaller piece of the pie.
233
 
ii.  Energy Resources Conservation Board 
Compared to the provincial government, Alberta’s citizens and local 
governments are likely less disposed toward supporting oil and gas 
development.
234
  Indeed, recently adopted oil and gas procedures for the 
 
 227 Facts and Statistics, supra note 64. 
 228 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 226. 
 229 Id. at 67.  The only things close to environmental considerations that are taken into 
account during this process are “any potential surface access restrictions that may be 
required by law or policy.”  Id. at 68.  If, for example, the government is considering selling 
underground rights below a surface area for which seasonal access is restricted (in order to 
protect wildlife), the Crown Mineral Disposition Review Committee (CMDRC) has the 
power to decide not to put these rights up for sale.  Id.  There is no indication that CMDRC 
has used its power to curb oil sands development, however. 
 230 Id. 
 231 WOYNILLOWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 232 Carrie Tait, Alberta Revamps Oil and Gas Royalty Regime, FINANCIALPOST.COM 
(Mar. 11, 2011, 9:31 PM), http://www.financialpost.com/news-
sectors/energy/story.html?id=2671896. 
 233 Id. 
 234 See, e.g., Jenny Christensen, Alberta’s Tar Sands, REVOLVE MAG. (July 14, 2012), 
http://www.revolve-magazine.com/home/2012/07/14/albertas-tar-sands/ (discussing 
opposition to oil sands development by indigenous groups living in Alberta and local 
farmers); Samantha Power, Environmentalism in Alberta?, PARKLAND POST, Winter 2008, at 
7, available at http://parklandinstitute.ca/downloads/posts/pp_2008_winter.pdf (commenting 
generally on the rise of environmental activism in Alberta, with the oil sands mentioned 
specifically as an area of concern); Gov’t Calls Green, Native Groups Oilsands 
“Adversaries,” CTV NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.ctvnews.ca/gov-t-calls-green-native-
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city of Edmonton suggest that this sentiment exists even in Alberta’s capital 
city: 
These principles clearly summarize Edmonton’s concerns and are 
indicative of the concerns of other municipalities as well. They are: 
(a) ensuring the safety of the public, including the minimization and 
prevention of risks to citizens’ health and well-being; (b) enabling 
the citizens of Edmonton to enjoy the best possible quality of life 
(social, health, economic, and environmental); (c) minimizing and 
managing nuisances from oil and gas activities (“including noise, 
odours, dust, glare, traffic and aesthetic concerns”); (d) ensuring that 
oil and gas activity does not negatively affect the City’s ability to 
undertake urban development; (e) ensuring that the City’s 
environmental policies (for example, the prevention of pollution) are 
achieved in conjunction with oil and gas development; (f) ensuring 
that the development of city infrastructure and oil and gas resources 




Accordingly, it seems reasonably clear that municipal interests are not 
always aligned with those of Alberta’s provincial government. 
Though opportunities do exist for municipalities to voice their 
concerns in a legally binding manner, these avenues do not appear to be 
particularly fruitful.  One such avenue deals with the approval of oil and gas 
projects.  Although Alberta has the exclusive power to grant oil and gas 
rights to private owners, it at times has to take into account the input of 
outside parties when approving discrete oil and gas projects.  Here, the 
relevant provincial entity is the Energy Resources Conservation Board 
(ERCB), which has the power to approve projects so long as they benefit 
not just the project’s applicant but also Alberta’s residents in general.236 
If a municipality objects to a specific approval, it may call for a public 
hearing so long as its rights are “directly and adversely” affected by the 
approval.
237
  This requirement, however, has been particularly difficult for 
municipalities to meet.
238
  Moreover, in most cases municipalities will not 
be entitled to cost recovery when participating in a public hearing, which 





 235 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 226, at 68. 
 236 Id. at 71. 
 237 Id. at 72. 
 238 See generally id. at 72–74 (discussing two recent examples of municipalities being 
denied standing in ERCB proceedings). 
 239 Id. at 78. 
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iii.  Municipal Government Act 
Another regulatory option, at least in theory, for local governments is 
Alberta’s Municipal Government Act (MGA), which grants municipalities 
power to exercise control over land use and development within their 
boundaries.
240
  However, section 618 of the MGA specifically prohibits 
municipalities from determining the use of oil and gas wells, batteries, and 
pipelines within their territories.
241
  This reflects the Alberta legislature’s 
general view that “as the lifeblood of Alberta’s economy,” oil and gas 
operations should “not be subjected to local control that might vary from 
place to place.”242 
Section 619 of the MGA gives municipalities some degree of power, 
allowing local governments to regulate elements of the oil sands industry 
not explicitly mentioned in section 618.
243
  Yet, local government authority 
is once again severely constrained in application, as municipalities may not 
regulate an infrastructure item falling under section 619 that the ERCB has 
previously dealt with in one of its own approvals.
244
  Thus, the MGA, 
though seemingly applicable to development within municipalities, is likely 
to be only a minimal hurdle for oil sands drillers to overcome. 
iv.  Alberta Land Stewardship Act 
The MGA aside, municipalities may also now take advantage of the 
recently enacted Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA).
245
  The ALSA 
grants Alberta’s Lieutenant Governor in Council the power to create 
subdivisions within the province and “regional plans” regulating land use in 
these areas.
246
  As of late 2012, the Alberta government has created seven 
planning areas.
247
  Although the Lieutenant Governor has “exclusive and 
final jurisdiction” over the contents of each regional plan,248 he or she may 
create “regional advisory councils” in each planning area to help with the 
creation and implementation of the plan.
249
  Members of a regional advisory 




 240 Alberta Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, s. 7 (Can.). 
 241 Id. s. 618(1)(b)–(c). 
 242 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 226, at 79. 
 243 Id.  Parts of the oil sands industry potentially under local purview here include 
processing plants and, indeed, oil sands mines themselves.  Id. 
 244 Alberta Municipal Government Act s. 7, art. 619(4). 
 245 Alberta Land Stewardship Act, R.S.A. 2009, c. A-26.8 (Can.). 
 246 Id. arts. 3–4. 
 247 See Alan Harvie & Trent Mercier, The Alberta Land Stewardship Act and Its Impact 
on Alberta’s Oil and Gas Industry, 48 ALTA. L. REV. 295, 298 (2010). 
 248 Alberta Land Stewardship Act s. 13(1). 
 249 See generally id. s. 52. 
 250 See Harvie & Mercier, supra note 247, at 299. 
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The regional development guidelines created with the help of the 
Regional Advisory Councils have the force of law in that they must be 
taken into account by other license-granting bodies within the provincial 
government.
251
  This means that the provincial government must now make 
sure that any disposition of oil and gas resources complies with any 
development restrictions imposed by regional plans.
252
  Similarly, the 
ERCB must now take heed of regional plans when approving energy 
projects.
253
  This is a significant change—one that departs from the 
regulatory regime described above and has the potential to swing the power 
dynamic in favor of municipalities. 
The Lower Athabasca Regional Plan (LARP), the regional plan 
covering the location of the oil sands, was announced on August 22, 2012, 
and took effect on September 1, 2012.  Though its impact on the province’s 
overall regulatory scheme remains unclear,
254
 a review of the language of 
the LARP yields several important details about the province’s posture 
towards the oil sands going forward.  First, the LARP is a ten-year plan, 
with the province reserving the right to update it every five years.
255
  The 
LARP’s “Strategic Plan” for the future references economic development 
first, and specifically lists goals such as increasing the yield of oil sands 
recovery and “optimizing the economic potential of the resource,” albeit in 
“ways that are environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable.”256  The 
LARP’s “Vision for the Lower Athabasca Region” echoes its Strategic 
Plan, mentioning the desire to “support development of the region and its 
oil sands reserves” before noting the importance of the region’s “air, water, 
land[,] and biodiversity.”257 
This is not to say that the LARP is devoid of regulatory specifics, 
however.  Rather, the LARP authorizes the government to set legally 
binding triggers and limits for a variety of chemical compounds for the 
purpose of maintaining air and water quality.
258
  The LARP also increases 
conservation land in the region by more than 1.5 million hectares, 
protecting approximately 22% of Lower Athabasca, including preexisting 
 
 251 Id. at 303–04. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 304. 
 254 Nathan Vanderklippe, Alberta Gives Way to Oil Patch in Land Protection Plan for 
Lower Athabasca, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:18 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-
resources/alberta-releases-land-protection-plan-for-lower-athabasca/article4493633/. 
 255 GOV’T OF ALTA., LOWER ATHABASCA REGIONAL PLAN 2012–2022, at 2 (2012), 
available at https://www.landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/Lower%20Athabasca
%20Regional%20Plan%202012-2022%20Approved%202012-08.pdf. 
 256 Id. at 14. 
 257 Id. at 22. 
 258 Id. at 73–78. 
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conservation land, from any development.
259
  This land includes 340,000 
hectares of presumably viable territory already controlled by oil and gas 
companies.
260
  Importantly, the LARP’s conservation efforts appear to have 
gained preliminary support from the influential Pembina Institute, which 
lauded Alberta’s government for its efforts and called the LARP a 
“promising start” to “responsible oil sands development.”261 
Nevertheless, the energy industry does not appear to be particularly 
deterred by the LARP.
262
  For one, the final version of the LARP included 
an important concession to developers, reducing the amount of 
economically viable conservation land by more than 31,000 hectares over 
earlier versions of the Plan.
263
  Moreover, much of the land protected by the 
LARP and its non-binding draft versions is located far from the oil sands’ 
home base of Fort McMurray, in areas with “little or no industrial 
activity.”264  Finally, since the terms of reference for the LARP were 
released in mid-2009,
265
 there has been only an uptick in commercial 
interest in the oil sands, as evidenced by the flurry of recent merger activity 
discussed earlier. 
v.  Alberta’s Emissions Controls 
Finally, Alberta’s government has tried to regulate the oil and gas 
industry through greenhouse gas emissions rules.  The foundational 
elements in Alberta’s scheme are the Climate Change and Emissions 
Management Act (CCEMA),
266
 the CCEMA’s accompanying Specified Gas 
Emitters Regulation,
267
 and Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy.268 
The Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, enacted in 2007, 
supplemented the CCEMA by requiring already-existing facilities emitting 
over 100,000 tonnes of greenhouse gases to both reduce emissions intensity 
 
 259 Id. at 83–84. 
 260 Vanderklippe, supra note 254.  These companies must now negotiate for 
compensation from the government in exchange for the land.  Id. 
 261 Press Release, Pembina Inst., Pembina Reacts to Tabling of the Lower Athabasca 
Regional Plan (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.pembina.org/media-release/2368. 
 262 Vanderklippe, supra note 254; see also, Press Release, S. Pac. Res. Corp., Southern 
Pacific Expects Minimal Impact from Alberta’s Draft Lower Athabasca Regional Plan (Apr. 
5, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/idUS37660+06-Apr-
2011+MW20110406. 
 263 Vanderklippe, supra note 254. 
 264 Harvie & Mercier, supra note 247, at 316. 
 265 See id. 
 266 Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, R.S.A. 2003, c. C-16.7 (Can.). 
 267 Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, Alta. Reg. 139/2007 (Can.). 
 268 GOV’T OF ALTA., ALBERTA’S 2008 CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY (2008), available at 
http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7894.pdf. 
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by 12% in 2007 and maintain reduced emissions in the future.
269
  Emissions 
intensity, as opposed to emissions in absolute terms, refers to total 
emissions created per one unit of production.
270
  Thus, emissions intensity 
can theoretically be reduced while overall emissions are actually increased.  
Regardless, in cases of non-compliance, offenders must buy credits from 
one of three sources: emitters in the same industry that have reduced 
emissions by more than the required amount (thus earning the credits), 
emitters in other industries that have done the same (these credits are 
technically called “offsets”), or the Alberta government itself, at a rate of 




Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy (2008 Strategy) was created 
in the context of the regulations above, and in response to the strong 
likelihood that Alberta would not meet its own provincial obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol.
272
  The 2008 Strategy is not legally binding, but is 
rather an aspirational document aimed at setting the stage for future 
action.
273
  Its primary goal is to mitigate emissions through efficient energy 
usage, carbon capture and sequestration, and greening energy production.
274
 
Overall, the 2008 Strategy aims to reduce net greenhouse gas 
emissions by fifty megatonnes by 2020, and by 200 megatonnes over 
business as usual levels by 2050.
275
  Carbon capture and sequestration 
 
 269 Alta. Reg. 139/2007, s. 3–4. 
 270 Id. s. 1(1)(b). 
 271 Press Release, Gov’t of Alta., Industry Has Three Options for Meeting Emissions 
Targets (Mar. 8, 2007), http://alberta.ca/home/NewsFrame.cfm?ReleaseID=/acn/200703/211
42336C71FD-D012-F54F-468B7C8FB604858B.html; see also Jodie Hierlmeier, 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation 101, 22 ENVTL. L. CTR. NEWS BRIEF, no. 4, 2007, at 1, 1, 
available at http://www.elc.ab.ca/Content_Files/Files/NewsBriefs/GreenhouseGasRegulatio
n101.pdf.  It should also be noted that the C$15 per tonne penalty is the practical 
consequence of non-compliance.  Technically, if an emitter misses the required reduction 
and takes no action at all, the emitter will be fined at a rate of C$200 per tonne.  Alta. Reg. 
139/2007, s. 28(1).  Thus, for all intents and purposes, the oil and gas industry recognizes the 
cost of non-compliance to be C$15 per tonne.  See Brian Burton, Alberta Needs Others to 
Follow, CALGARY HERALD 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.calgaryherald.com/technology/Alberta+needs+others+follow/55
63307/story.html. 
 272 Meadows & Crossman, supra note 99, at 428, 432. 
 273 See GOV’T OF ALTA., supra note 268, at 10 (“This strategy outlines an initial set of key 
actions to be taken over the next several years.  Specific actions will be outlined in a follow-
up implementation plan.”). 
 274 Id. at 7. 
 275 Id.  While the 2008 Strategy does not define “business as usual,” the government’s 
position on the term is “a projection of emissions and output that would have occurred in the 
absence of the regulations.”  Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions, ENV’T CAN., 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/p7_eng.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
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technology is a key part of the program’s hopes—the 2008 Strategy relies 




Ultimately, however, the emissions reductions contemplated by the 
2008 Strategy do not necessarily present a significant impediment to future 
oil sands development.  The 2008 Strategy, after all, does not itself prohibit 
current and future oil sands projects; it only sets net reduction targets.  
Similarly, the CCEMA only requires a reduction in emissions intensity.  
Thus, the province’s ability to meet its projected targets relies just as much 
on technology and an increase in emissions efficiency as it does on limiting 
future oil sands development.  This increase in efficiency does not appear 
illusory; the emissions intensity of the oil sands industry fell by 29% 
between 1990 and 2009, before increasing by 2% between 2009 and 
2012.
277
  The industry is confident that per-barrel greenhouse gas emissions 




IV. DISCUSSION: COMPARING FOSSIL FUEL REGULATION IN 
PENNSYLVANIA AND ALBERTA 
Having addressed many of the major regulatory hurdles to 
unconventional fossil fuel extraction in Pennsylvania and Alberta, this 
Comment asks in this Part which of these venues would be more attractive 
to a hypothetical, resource-agnostic energy company looking for drilling 
opportunities.  To reach a conclusion in this regard, this Comment seeks to 
differentiate how the regulatory regimes discussed in Part III treat their 
respective natural resources. 
This is not to suggest that Pennsylvania and Alberta’s regimes are 
polar opposites, however.  These regulatory regimes are far more similar 
than they are different.  On the whole, it is safe to say that favorable, 
business-friendly conditions for drilling exist in each region. 
The federal governments in the United States and Canada, for instance, 
are relatively supportive of the unconventional oil and gas industry.
279
  
Federal regulations in both countries generally appear to be tolerant of the 
 
 276 Meadows & Crossman, supra note 99, at 434. 
 277 Oilsands’ Emissions Rising, CBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2011/12/16/pol-capp-oil-industry-emissions-
report.html (“The 2010 two percent increase marks a small chink in [the industry’s] 
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 278 van Loon, supra note 97. 
 279 See Egan, supra note 13 (discussing Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper); 
Ayesha Rascoe & Edward McAllister, Obama Backs Shale Drilling, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-usa-obama-speech-energy-
idUSTRE80O06P20120125. 
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methods used to extract these fossil fuels from the ground.
280
  
Unconventional fossil fuel extraction also enjoys the support of the 
state/provincial governments of both regions.
281
 
Further, state and provincial governments in both regions are moving 
to limit the power of municipalities to regulate the oil and gas activities 
occurring within their borders.  In Alberta, local governments have trouble 
using the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) to appeal specific 
oil sands approvals,
282
 and are essentially barred from using the Municipal 
Government Act (MGA) to limit development.
283
  While the Alberta Land 
Stewardship Act (ALSA) in theory allows for a regional voice in planning 
oil sands development, the language of the Lower Athabasca Regional Plan 
(LARP) still seems to favor the energy sector above all else.
284
  The 
situation is similar, albeit more tenuous, in Pennsylvania, where the passage 
and potential enforcement of Act 13 threatens the progress made by 
municipal governments via the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling 
in Huntley & Huntley v. Council of Oakmont.  In any case, in both 
Pennsylvania and Alberta, the local constituencies that are typically most 




Nevertheless, regulation is not identical in Pennsylvania and Alberta.  
Differences in status quo regulatory schemes do exist, as do differences in 
attitude among certain regulatory actors.  This Comment contends that these 
issues lead to three primary regulatory divergences between the two 
regions. 
 
 280 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the EPA and fracking); supra Part III.B.1 
(discussing the Kyoto Protocol and Canada’s greenhouse gas output). 
 281 See supra notes 162–172 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania’s pro-shale 
gas industry laws); O’Grady, supra note 17 (discussing Alberta’s support of the oil and gas 
industry).  It should also be noted that Premier Redford’s main political opposition, the 
Wildrose Party, is even more in favor of oil sands development that she is.  See Claudia 
Catteneo, Wildrose, Conservatives Pitch Differing Versions of Future Oil Patch, FIN. POST 
(Apr. 20, 2012, 6:58 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/2012/04/20/differing-visions-of-
future-oil-patch-in-alberta-election-fight/. 
 282 See supra notes 236–239 and accompanying text. 
 283 See supra notes 240–242 and accompanying text. 
 284 See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text. 
 285 See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 234; Power, supra note 234; Gov’t Calls Green, 
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A.  There is a Greater Risk of Increased Federal Regulation in the United 
States than in Canada 
Although the federal governments of the United States and Canada 
seem favorably disposed towards the unconventional fossil fuel industry, 
there may be greater risk of increased federal control over the extraction 
process in the United States.  The possibility of increased federal control is 
driven by the actions of two entities: the EPA and U.S. Congress. 
The EPA likely has the ability to spur increased federal regulation by 
finding a concrete link between hydraulic fracturing and water 
contamination.  An initial progress report on its study of the subject is due 
in late 2012.
286
  Though many of the EPA’s recent actions287 have suggested 
that it may be pessimistic (or even indifferent) about fracking’s relationship 
with water quality, the Agency’s own testing has already begun to establish 
such a relationship.
288
  Moreover, in April 2012 the EPA gave notice of its 
intent to regulate fracking under the Clean Air Act, issuing rules that will be 
fully implemented by 2015.
289
  Among other things, oil and gas wells must 
now have equipment able to capture escaping volatile organic compound 
emissions.
290
  While major drillers do not view the EPA’s “green 
completion” requirement as a huge burden,291 its mere existence does 
suggest that the EPA may now be ready to further regulate fracking. 
If the EPA does establish a connection between fracking and 
groundwater contamination, Congress may be inclined to revisit amending 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) through passage of the Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act).
292
  If the 
FRAC Act were to pass, its impact on shale gas drillers would likely be 
significant.  The cost of compliance with EPA permitting requirements and 




 286 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 130. 
 287 See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text. 
 288 Drajem, supra note 134. 
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http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf.  This is the first time that the 
EPA has used the Clean Air Act to regulate fracking.  Id. 
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 291 Jim Efstathiou Jr., Drillers Say Costs Manageable from Pending Gas Emissions Rule, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2012, 5:00 A.M.), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-
17/drillers-say-costs-manageable-from-pending-gas-emissions-rule.html. 
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REV. (Jan. 5, 2012), http://tomwilber.blogspot.com/2012/01/status-of-frac-act-gone-today-
here.html (commenting on a discussion with a representative for New York Representative 
Maurice Hinchey, an initial author of the FRAC Act). 
 293 TIEMANN & VANN, supra note 120, at 27 (citing a U.S. Department of Energy 
estimate). 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:393 (2013) 
434 
Permitting under the SDWA could also duplicate permitting at the state 
level, wasting a driller’s time and resources.294  Finally, the SDWA’s citizen 
suit provision could cause headaches for drillers, as they would be exposed 
to the threat of “litigation, injunction[,] or other delay tactics” from those 
opposed to shale drilling.
295
  Though passage of the FRAC Act is unlikely, 
the risk of regulation under the SDWA is an outcome a driller may want to 
avoid if given the choice. 
Regardless, the mere existence of the FRAC Act suggests that the 
chances of increased federal regulation in the United States are higher than 
those in Canada, which is constrained both politically and constitutionally.  
Politically, the Harper administration has only made oil sands extraction 
easier by pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol and generally taking a favorable 
stance to the oil sands industry in spite of changes to the tax code.  
Constitutionally, the federal government cannot pass laws that directly 
regulate non-renewable resources.
296
  Rather, it is limited to regulating the 
oil sands under the re-enacted Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(CEAA), which is more favorable to development than its predecessor.
297
  
Thus, at the federal level, drillers are likely to face higher regulatory hurdles 
in the United States. 
B.  Restrictive Municipal Regulation is a Greater Threat in Pennsylvania 
than it is in Alberta 
As mentioned previously, provincial regulation in Alberta via the 
ERCB, MGA, and ALSA places shackles on rulemaking at the local level.  
Though the LARP created under the ALSA has not had sufficient time to 
fully impact local communities, its language and general non-interference 
with land used for oil sands extraction suggests that it is predominately a 
pro-industry document.
298
  Moreover, the LARP has gained some degree of 
support from the influential Pembina Institute.
299
  This suggests that there 
actually may be few local objections (at least in the environmental arena) to 
Alberta’s treatment of the oil sands, at least at this point. 
Environmental objections to shale drilling in Pennsylvania, on the 
other hand, are both numerous and fierce.
300
  Using zoning powers currently 
supported by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Huntley,301 
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 295 Id. (quoting an oil and gas industry report). 
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no. 5 (Can.). 
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municipalities have created local laws that make drilling confusing and 
potentially unprofitable for shale drillers.
302
  Though such provisions are 
perhaps of dubious legality, municipalities have even attempted to enact 
outright bans of shale drilling within their borders.
303
 
Of course, many of these regulatory hurdles will disappear if 
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court reverses Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth 
and the State is allowed to implement section 3304 of Act 13.  This 
provision, when combined with the impact fees instituted by Act 13, gives 
the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act a carrot-and-stick character that both 
encourages local governments to drop anti-shale zoning laws in exchange 
for revenue, and punishes these governments for failing to comply.  Though 
some municipalities will inevitably hold out, the parts of Pennsylvania 
capable of receiving a great deal of impact fee revenue seem likely to fall in 
line with the state’s pro-drilling agenda.304 
 
 302 Maher, supra note 52. 
 303 A municipal ban on shale drilling would prevent the reasonable development of oil 
and gas resources and thus violate section 3304 of Act 13.  58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304 
(2012).  If Robinson Twp. is upheld, however, the issue of a ban’s legality becomes closer.  
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requires that local zoning ordinances “provide for the reasonable development of minerals in 
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Laura Olson & Joe Smydo, PUC Says Pittsburgh’s Ban on Natural Gas Extraction Conflicts 
with State Law, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Sep. 11, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/puc-says-pittsburghs-ban-on-natural-gas-
extraction-conflicts-with-state-law-652858/#ixzz26CWnyggO. 
 Nevertheless, moratoriums remain a threat to drillers.  In 2011, referendums to ban 
drilling appeared on ballots in State College, Peters Township, and Warren.  Janice 
Crompton, Bid to Ban Drilling in Peters is Defeated; Voters in State College Succeed, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 9, 2011, 12:35 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/11313/1188498-503.stm.  The referendum passed in State College, though 
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Play Update, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 8, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/292408-utica-
shale-oil-play-update.  The referendums in Peters Township and Warren failed, primarily 
due to public concern over the economic ramifications of such measures.  Crompton, supra 
note 303. 
 304 See, e.g., Laura Olson, Pa. Could Withhold South Fayette’s Impact Fee Revenue, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 19, 2012, 12:17 AM), http://www.post-
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revenue-658235/.  While South Fayette is willing to forgo about $2,700 in impact fee 
revenue for the sake of maintaining tight regulations, it remains to be seen if other 
municipalities are willing to sacrifice checks from the state government at least one-hundred 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:393 (2013) 
436 
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania drillers cannot yet count on a predictable, 
business-friendly regulatory environment paid for by Act 13 impact fees.  
Instead, entrants into the region must deal with a status quo of inconsistent 
local regulation, as well as a ban on drilling throughout much of central 
Pennsylvania courtesy of the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC).  
Much like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s pending decision in Robinson 
Twp., there is no set timeline for a vote on the DRBC’s draft regulations.305  
This puts drilling in Pennsylvania in a true state of flux—a situation that is 
likely less attractive to a resource-agnostic developer than the prospect of 
drilling in Alberta. 
C.  Worst-Case Regulatory Scenarios: Outright Drilling Ban in 
Pennsylvania vs. Emissions Limits in Alberta 
The DRBC’s moratorium on drilling and the pending appeal in 
Robinson Twp. illustrate the dangerous potential endgame for drillers in the 
Marcellus Shale.  In the worst-case scenario for these drillers, the DRBC 
ban would continue indefinitely, and Robinson Twp. would be upheld.  The 
very possibility of gas drilling in many parts of Pennsylvania would then be 
imperiled by either the DRBC moratorium or municipalities that once again 
have the license to use zoning laws to severely limit fracking within their 
borders.  In other words, the worst-case scenario would be a reversion to, 
and most likely an extension of, the state’s current regulatory uncertainty. 
As a general matter, no such risk exists in Alberta.  While the LARP 
reserves 340,000 hectares (or 3,400 square kilometers) of commercially 
viable oil sands for conservation,
306
 this is only a small percentage of the 
149,000 square kilometers of oil sands located in Alberta.
307
  For all intents 
and purposes, the most stringent limitation of the daily extraction and 
processing of oil sands are greenhouse gas emissions intensity limits set by 
the Alberta Specified Gas Emitters Regulation.  If a driller has exceeded its 
emissions intensity limit under this law, it in theory will at least have to 
partially stop drilling. 
However, because this law regulates emissions intensity and not 
absolute emissions, drillers can continue increasing oil sands extraction 
output so long as they emit greenhouse gasses more efficiently.
308
  
Currently, the oil sands industry is confident in its ability to increase this 
efficiency.
309
  This suggests that on some level the Specified Gas Emitters 
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Regulation is no real barrier to oil sands extraction at all. 
Moreover, even if drillers fail to comply with the Specified Gas 
Emitters Regulation’s emissions intensity targets, they can still continue to 
emit as much greenhouse gas as they want.  All they have to do to 
compensate for these emissions is buy credits or pay a C$15 fine for each 
non-compliant tonne of greenhouse gas emitted.
310
  A fine of this size does 
not appear to be a deterrent to continued oil sands extraction.
311
  Nor is the 
fine high enough to incentivize drillers to lower emissions through an 
investment in the carbon capture and sequestration technology favored by 
the Alberta 2008 Strategy.
312
  Further, there is no indication that the fee will 
ever increase, as Alberta does not appear inclined to antagonize the oil 




Ultimately, this Comment concludes that a hypothetical energy 
company indifferent to investing in Alberta’s oil sands or Pennsylvania’s 
shale would be better served by choosing the former, based solely on the 
relative business friendliness of its federal, provincial, and local regulatory 
scheme.  Alberta’s business friendliness relative to Pennsylvania manifests 
itself in three primary ways. 
First, there is less risk of increased federal regulation of 
unconventional fossil fuel extraction in Canada, compared to the United 
States.  Second, Alberta’s current provincial laws leave less room for 
potentially unfavorable local-government rulemaking than do the state laws 
of Pennsylvania.  Finally, there is little risk of an outright ban on oil sands 
extraction in Canada, while the risk of a ban is higher in Pennsylvania.  For 
all intents and purposes, the regulation with the most potential to shut down 
Alberta’s oil sands operations—the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation—is 
not much of a threat to development.  Thus, an energy company looking to 
invest in North America’s unconventional fossil fuel revolution would be 
well served to invest in Alberta and its oil sands. 
This is not to say that Pennsylvania is overtly hostile to investment in 
the status quo, however.  Despite the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the 
EPA’s study of fracking and water quality, the DRBC’s ban on fracking in 
central Pennsylvania, and the conflict between municipal zoning ordinances 
and the state’s support for the oil and gas industry, drillers continue to flood 
the region.  Yet, when given a choice to invest in Pennsylvania or Alberta 
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with all other issues held equal, one cannot ignore this uncertainty and its 
potential implications for development.  Perhaps Pennsylvania will become 
more attractive when the EPA releases its final study on fracking, or when 
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court decides the fate of Act 13.  For now, 
however, Alberta appears to be the safer, more business friendly option. 
 
